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ARTICLES
REFORMING THE GRANTOR TRUST RULES
Jay A. Soled-,:
INTRODUCrION
Few things in the Internal Revenue Code (Code) are as enduring
as the grantor trust rules. Housed in Subpart E of SubchapterJ of the
Code,' they are essentially the same rules that were instituted by the
so-called Clifford trust regulations promulgated over a half-century
ago.2 In instances where the grantor trust rules apply, the Code ig-
nores the separate existence of a trust.3 Items of income, deductions,
* Jay A. Soled is a professor at Rutgers University. The author thanks Mark L
Ascher, professor at University of Texas School of Law, for his insightful comments
and suggestions.
1 I.R.C. §§ 671-679 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
2 Sections 29.22(a)-21 and 29.22(a)-22 were added to Secdon 29.22(a) of Trea-
sury Regulation 111 by T.D. 5488, 1946-1 C.B. 19, promulgated December 29, 1945.
When these regulations were issued, some commentators viewed them with disdain,
see, e.g., Edmund W. Pavenstedt, The Treasurj Legislates: The Distortion of the Clifford
Rue, 2 TAx. L. REV. 7 (1946), while others held them in high esteem, see, e.g., Louis
Eisenstein, The Clifford Regulations and the Heavenly City of Legislathe Intention, 2 TAx
L. Rrv. 327 (1947).
3 The Internal Revenue Service (Service) and most courts equate a grantor and
a grantor trust as being one and the same taxpayer. Se, eg., Rev. Rul. 66-159, 1966-1
C.B. 162 (holding that a grantor trust is the alter ego of the taxpayer and, that being
the case, the trustee of a grantor trust that owned and sold the grantors principal
residence was entitled to use the tax-free roll-over provisions of former Code § 1034).
There are instances, however, where courts have not equated a grantor and a grantor
trust as the same taxpayer. See, e.g., Rothstein v. United States, 735 F.2d 704, 709 (2d
Cir. 1984) (holding, for purposes of analyzing a sales transaction, that a grantor trust
was to be a separate entity). For detailed discussions regarding the issue of whether
and when a grantor trust should be ignored or respected as a separate entity, see
generally Mark L Ascher, When to Ignore Grantor Trusts: The Prewedents, a Proposal and a
Prediction, 41 TAX L REv. 253 (1986), and Thomas IV. Henning, Note, Treatment of the
Grantor Trust as a Separate Entity 32 TAx L. RExv. 409 (1977).
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and credits against tax are instead attributed to the grantor.4 Grant-
ors are thus unable to deflect income away from themselves to others
(such as a trust or a trust beneficiary) whose income is taxed at a lower
marginal rate.5 The purpose of the grantor trust rules then, and their
purpose now, is to safeguard the progressive rate structure of the in-
come tax. 6
Among the many well-known tax maxims is one that states a
"good tax is an old tax."7 In practice, however, maxims may not always
prove true, and the grantor trust rules represent such a case. In the
intervening decades since the introduction of the grantor trust rules,
the Code has undergone significant changes. Insofar as grantor trust
status is concerned, the most significant changes are those related to
the progressive rate structure of the income tax and its application.
More specifically, the steeply progressive tax bracket rate structure of
the past has been eliminated.8 In addition, trust income is essentially
taxed at a flat tax rate equal to the highest individual tax rate;9 mar-
ried couples can file joint tax returns and thus have no incentive to
4 I.R.C. § 671 (1994).
5 To illustrate, consider the situation of a taxpayer whose income is subject to
the highest tax bracket and who establishes a revocable trust. Suppose this trust gen-
erates $100 of interest income. In the absence of the grantor trust rules, this income
would be taxable to the trust and bear no tax due to the personal exemption afforded
trusts under id. § 642(b). As a grantor trust, however, the trust entity is ignored and
the $100 of interest income is instead reported on the grantor's income tax return
and is taxed at the grantor's income tax rate. Id. §§ 671, 676(a).
6 Committee reports that accompanied passage of the grantor trust rules indi-
cate that Congress wanted to institute "rules to determine when a trust's income is to
be taxed to the grantor because of the grantor's substantial dominion and control
over the trust property or income." H.R. REP. No. 83-1337, at 4089 (1954), reprinted in
1954 U.S.C.CA.N. 4017, at 4089.
7 See 2 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH
OF NATIONS 920-21 (R.H. Campbell et al. eds., LibertyClassics 1981) (1776). For fur-
ther discussions regarding the merits of this and other tax maxims, see Herbert Stein,
What's Wrong with the Federal Tax System?, in HousE COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 86TH
CONG., TAx REVISION COMPENDIUM 107 (Comm. Print 1959) ("Old taxes are good
taxes. The economic system has adjusted to them so as to reduce discriminatory ef-
fects that they might have had when first imposed."); Wiui~ A. KLEIN, Poucv ANALV.
sis OF THE FEDERAL INcOME TAX 137-38 (1976); Joseph Sneed, The Criteria of Federal
Income Tax Policy, 17 STAN. L. REV. 567, 572-74 (1965).
8 The Internal Revenue Code of 1954, for example, had twenty-four different
rate brackets for individual taxpayers, with an initial tax rate bracket of 20% that
climbed gradually to 91%. Act of Aug. 16, 1954, ch. 73651, 68A Stat. 1 (redesignated
as Internal Revenue Code of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 2, 100 Stat. 2095). In con-
trast, the Code today has only five rate brackets for individual taxpayers, with an initial
tax rate bracket of 15% that climbs gradually to 39.6%. I.R.C. § 1 (West Supp. 2000).
9 I.R.C. § 1(e) (1994).
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divide their income;' 0 and beyond a certain minimum threshold, the
unearned income of children under the age of fourteen is taxed at
their parents' highest marginal tax rate."1 Independent of the gran-
tor trust rules, these changes significantly diminish tax-payers' incen-
tive and ability to shift income to those whose incomes are subject to
lower tax rates.
The rules regarding grantor trust status have become rules in
search of a purpose and, one might think, relegated to a relic of a
bygone era. But where classification as a grantor trust was once to be
avoided at all costs (hence their common classification by practition-
ers and commentators alike as "defective trusts") ,12 taxpayers may now
deliberately establish grantor trusts as a way to minimize their income
and transfer tax burdens.13 In short, taxpayers use as a shield what
was once a sword of the Internal Revenue Service (Service). This
thwarts congressional intent and leads to significant revenue losses.
14
10 See id. § 6013(a); BoRS I. BrrnER & MARTtNJ. McMAHoN,JR, FEDERAL INCO',IE
TAXATION OF INDivmuALs 44.2[2], at 44-14 (2d ed. 1995) ("[:Married couples have
no incentive to engage in income-splitting devices to shift income from one spouse to
the other, the joint return itself is an efficient income-splitting device, which produces
the same tax result as an actual equal division of their taxable income between the
two spouses."). For an historical look at the legislation that introduced joint returns,
see Stanley Surrey, Federal Taxation of the Family-The Revenue Act of 1948, 61 HRv. I
REv. 1097, 1103-16 (1948). See also Boris I. Bittker, Federal Income Taxation and the
Family, 27 STAN. L. REv. 1389, 1412-14 (1975) (discussing Congress's passage of op-
tional joint return legislation).
11 See I.R.C. § 1(g) (West Supp. 2000).
12 E.g., George Brode,Jr., Tax Shdter Prblem Areas-Potential Deprcdation Recapture
on Death ofa Partner, Phantom Gain, and the DefectiVe Trust Gambit, 54 TAXIS 306 (1976);
Burton W. Kanter, Supplementary Comment on the "Defective Trust Gambit, '54 TAXES 6S6
(1976).
13 Virginia F. Coleman, The Grantor Trust: Yesterday's Disaster, Today's Delight, To-
morrow ?, 30 INsr. ON EST. PLA. 800 (1996); Randolph Harris, GRIT's, GR;T's &
Grantor Trusts: Be Graciously Greedy While the Grass is Green, Before It Gradually Grows
Grisly & Grim, 29 INsT. ON EST. PLAN. 900 (1995); Carmen Irizany-Dfaz, How Defec-
tive Is Your Trust? Suggestions on Structuring an Intentionally Defective Grantor Trust, 41
TAx MGm. MENORANDUM 231 (2000); Michael D. Mulligan, Sale to an Intentionally
Defective Irrevocable Trust for a Balloon Note-An End Run Around Chapter 14?, 32 I 'ST. oN
EST. PLAN. 1500 (1998); StevenJ. Oshins, Sales to Grantor Trusts: Exponential Leverage
Using Multiple Installment Sales, 13 PROB. & PROP., Jan./Feb. 1999, at 46; Randell W.
Roth, The Intentional Use of Tax-Defective Trusts, 26 INsT. ON EsT. PLN. 1400 (1992).
For a discussion of how taxpayers achieve their tax minimization goals, see infra Part
II.B.
14 The Code exacerbates this problem by defining grantor trust status in a ay
that permits taxpayers to choose virtually at will (and often wvith very little conse-
quence) whether grantor trust status will apply. For a discussion of how txpayers can
manipulate trust terms to elect in and out of grantor trust status, see infra Part lll.B.
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Some fifty years ago, the progressive rate structure of the income
tax system required that grantor trust status be defined broadly.'r To-
day, however, in light of how the Code has evolved, just the opposite is
true.16 The time has come, therefore, for Congress to narrow the
scope and applicability of grantor trust status to the few remaining
situations where its classification is still appropriate.
This Article is divided into several Parts. Part I outlines the fac-
tors that led to the introduction of grantor trust rules and suggests
that these rules were generally well-crafted and effective in accom-
plishing the venerable goal of protecting the progressive rate struc-
ture of the income tax. Part II summarizes the grantor trust rules and
their implications and examines why many taxpayers, over a h,'f-cen-
tury since the introduction of these rules, now utilize them to their
advantage. Part III discusses the common methods that grantors em-
ploy to transform non-grantor trusts into grantor trusts. Part IV sets
forth a proposal to change the grantor trust rules in order to halt the
abusive use of grantor trust status. The final Part concludes that re-
forming the grantor trust rules would put these rules in better align-
ment with the rest of the Code and catapult them out of their
anachronistic state.
I. BACKGROUND
Trusts have long been recognized as separate taxpayers under the
Code, with their own tax bracket structure.17 Under state law, a trust
may be established orally or with a few strokes of a pen or clicks of a
word processor.' In an age of computers, laser printers, and copy
machines, trust formation has never been easier. Not all trusts, how-
ever, warrant recognition as separate taxpayers. 19 The grantor trust
15 See supra note 8.
16 See id.
17 See Revenue Act of 1916, Pub. L. No. 64-271, § 2(a)-(b), 39 Stat. 756, 757-58,
repealed 5y Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 1400, 42 Stat. 227, 320-21.
18 See 1 AUSTIN WAKiAN ScoTr & WiLLIAM FRANKuN FRATCHER, THE LAW OF
TRUSTS § 52 (4th ed. 1987 & Supp. 2000 (Mark L. Ascher, auth.)) (stating that state
law generally permits trusts which do not convey real property to be created orally).
But see N.Y. EST. PoWERS & TRUSTS LAw § 7-17(a) (McKinney Supp. 2000) (requiring
that a trust be in writing and executed and acknowledged by the initial grantor).
19 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 643(f) (1994) (treating multiple trusts as one trust if "such
trusts have substantially the same grantor or grantors and substantially the same pri-
mary beneficiary or beneficiaries" and noting that a principal purpose behind the
establishment of such trusts is the avoidance of tax); Boyce v. United States, 190 F.
Supp. 950, 950 (W.D. La. 1961) (involving a taxpayer who established ninety trusts for
the same beneficiary to exploit the use of a $100 per trust credit available under prior
law), afjd per curiam, 296 F.2d 731 (5th Cir. 1961).
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rules were a response to tax avoidance; their purpose was to stem the
onslaught of innovative taxpayers who sought to minimize their tax
burdens through trust establishment.
20
The grantor trust rules attempt to determine when a trust should
be respected for tax purposes and when it should be ignored. More
specifically, the grantor trust rules recognize the separate existence of
a trust when a grantor has parted with dominion and control over the
contributed trust property, but ignore the separate existence of a trust
when the grantor has retained dominion and control over trust assets.
Left unchecked, respect under the Code for all trusts would prove a
boon to grantors and a bust to the government
21
The following Subsections examine (A) the circumstances that
led taxpayers to establish trusts where they retained dominion and
control over trust property, (B) the judiciary's and Treasury Depart-
ment's reactions to such trust establishment, and (C) the Congres-
sional introduction of the grantor trust rules and the initial
effectiveness of these rules.
A. Circumstances that Led to the Expansion of Trust Formation
In general, a family unit can save taxes by shifting income from
one family member whose income is subject to a high marginal tax
rate to another family member whose income is subject to a lower
20 S. REP. No. 83-1622, at 86-87, 364-72 (1954), reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A4N.
4621, 4718-19, 5005-13; H.R. REP. No. 83-1337, at 63-64, 211-17 (1954), reprinted in
1954 U.S.C.CGA.N. 4017, 4089-90, 4350-57.
21 To illustrate, suppose there was a 10% tax rate on all income up to $50,000 and
a 50% tax rate on income in excess of $50,000. Suppose further that a taxpayer annu-
ally earns $50,000 interest on each of two identical corporate bonds she owns. Under
this set of assumptions, the taxpayer normally bears an annual tax of $30,000 ((.10 x
$50,000) + (.50 x $50,000)) on the interest income she receives.
Instead, suppose the taxpayer establishes a trust. Suppose further that the tax-
payer designates her spouse as trustee and she transfers title to one of the tw-o corpo-
rate bonds she owns to the trustee. The terms of the trust state that the trust is being
established for the benefit of the taxpayer's daughter. Notwithstanding this declara-
tion, the terms of the trust also provide the trustee with the right to apply the trust
income and principal for the use or benefit of the taxpayer. From the taxpayer's
perspective, the establishment and funding of this trust is a non-event. The taxpayer's
spouse is likely to acquiesce to the taxpayer's demands, and the assets of the trust may
be expended for the taxpayer's benefit. Despite the absence of any sacrifice on the
taxpayer's part, were the Code to respect this arrangement, the taxpayer and her
family would be economically much better off. More specifically, the taxpayer and
the trustee of the trust would each bear a tax of $5000 (.10 x $50,000) or a total tax of
$10,000 on the interest income they each earned. The $20,000 difference of overall
tax burden between not establishing a trust ($30,000) and establishing a trust
($10,000) would all come at the government's expense.
2001]
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marginal tax rate. For example, if a taxpayer whose income is subject
to a 70% marginal tax rate owns a share of corporate stock that pays
an annual dividend of $100, the taxpayer may gift that stock to his
adult daughter whose income is subject to a 20% marginal tax rate.
By gifting the corporate stock, the taxpayer's family unit will achieve
an overall tax reduction of $50. This is the difference between the
amount of tax on the dividend if no gift had been made (.7 x $100 =
$70) and the tax that will now be paid on the dividend (.2 x $100 -
$20). Both the courts and the Code respect the validity of this trans-
fer and sanction this outcome.
22
Despite the tax benefits associated with outright gifts of income-
producing property, taxpayers are often reluctant to make such trans-
fers due to loss of economic security and control. Taxpayers would
much prefer an arrangement that minimizes their (and their fami-
lies') tax burdens yet poses no meaningful sacrifices on their part.
Prior to the advent of grantor trust rules, the use of trusts seemed to
supply the perfect solution to these dual, yet conflicting, goals.
2 3
Trusts were subject to theirown progressive tax rates, and careful trust
drafting could position taxpayers with dominion and control over
trust property. These features proved to be a powerful, attractive
force for many taxpayers.
2 4
The assignment of income doctrine was probably another reason
for the popularity of trust establishment. This doctrine dates back to
1930 when Justice Holmes declared in Lucas v. Earl25 that "the fruits"
of a taxpayer's labor could not be "attributed to a different tree from
that on which they grew" insofar as service income was concerned.2 6
Some years after the assignment of income doctrine became part of
tax common law, 27 its application was extended to situations in which
22 See I.R.C. § 102(b) (1994); Williams v. Comm'r, 36 T.C. 195, 201 (1961) (hold-
ing that income earned on gifted property is taxable to the recipient).
23 C.W. Leaphart, The Use of the Trust to Escape the Imposition of Federal Income and
Estate Taxes, 15 CoRNEr. L.Q. 587, 587 (1930).
24 Id.
25 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
26 Id. at 115.
27 Some commentators contend that the assignment of income doctrine
originated as a means to preserve the progressive rate structure of the income tax. See
BrrmTT_ & McMAHoN, supra note 10, 1 34.1, at 34-3 ("[T]he courts recognized at the
outset that transfers within the family, if honored by federal tax law, could seriously
undermine the progressive rate schedule."); Ralph S. Rice, Judicial Trends in Gratuitous
Assignments to Avoid FederalIncome Taxes, 64 YALE L.J. 991, 991 (1955) (recognizing that
"[taxpayers in the higher income brackets often seek to redirect their income to
objects of their bounty in order to minimize the progressive features of the tax");
Lloyd George Soil, Intra-Family Assignments: Attribution and Realization of Income, 6 TAx
[VOL- 76:2
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taxpayers made gifts of income but did not transfer the underlying
income-producing property (for example, a gift of bond interest cou-
pons, but not the bond itself).2 8 The Court stated that "[t]he power
to dispose of income is the equivalent of ownership of it"2 and that
such income should remain taxable to the owner of such property."
The extension of the assignment of income doctrine to the gifting
arena hampered taxpayers' efforts to minimize their taxes. Thus, tax-
payers searched for alternatives. Trust establishment appeared to be
one such alternative, drawing the attention of many taxpayers.3'
B. Intervention by the Judidary
Taxpayers often crafted trust instruments offering themselves the
promise of dominion and control over trust property without its at-
tendant tax burdens. The Supreme Court, however, made sure that
this promise could not easily be kept. 2 This Section analyzes three
Supreme Court decisions that established firm precedents against
abusive trust use.3 3
L REv. 435, 435 (1951) ("The problem of the gratuitous intra-family assignment is a
creature of the progressive surtax."). At least one commentator believes that the as-
signment of income doctrine originated as a matter of "convenience and fairness."
Alan Gunn, Tax Avoidance, 76 MicH. L Rxv. 733, 762 (1978).
28 Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112, 113 (1940).
29 Id. at 118.
30 Id.
31 Another probable allure of trust formation at that time was the then rate differ-
ential between the gift and estate taxes. The transfer tax rate levied on gifts used to
be significantly lower than that levied on one's estate. SeeJames Casner, American Law
Institute Federal Estate and Gift Pjec, 22 TAx L. RE,. 515, 516 (1967); Theodore S.
Sims, Timing Under a Unified Wealth Transfer Tax, 51 U. Cm. L RE%. 34, 34-35 n.3
(1984). To capture this rate differential, it was advantageous for taxpayers to make
inter vivos transfers rather than testamentary bequests. Thus, beyond the potential
income tax savings offered by trusts, their establishment offered another mechanism
for taxpayers and their families to minimize their overall tax burden.
32 The importance of protecting the Code's progressive rate structure is captured
by Justice Cardozo's description of the damage unchecked trust establishment might
render. "By the creation of trusts, incomes ha[ve] been so divided and subdivided as
to withdraw from the Government the benefit of the graduated taxes and surtaxes
applicable to income when concentrated in a single ownership." Burnet v. Wells, 289
U.S. 670, 675 (1933). Consider, too, Justice Douglas's comment that "[we granted
certiorari [in Clifford] because of the importance to the revenue of the use of such
short term trusts in the reduction of surtaxes." Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331,
334 (1940).
33 While this trilogy of Supreme Court decisions likely played a decisive role in
limiting abusive trust arrangements, it did not entirely eliminate them. Something
more was dearly needed, and that something more was supplied by the Treasury De-
20o1]
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In Corliss v. Bowers,34 the Court held that the benchmark of taxa-
bility is not necessarily tide ownership to property, but rather its con-
trol.35 The facts in Bowers are straightforward: the taxpayer
established a trust providing income for his wife for life with the re-
mainder to their children.3 6 In addition, the taxpayer reserved a dis-
cretionary right to revoke or amend the trust in whole or in part.
3 7
The issue before the Court was the constitutionality of section 219(g)
of the Revenue Act of 1924,38 which stated that the grantor, rather
than the trust, was the appropriate taxpayer when the grantor estab-
lished a revocable trust.39
In a pithy analysis that has an acerbic ring, Justice Holmes
frowned upon the taxpayer's position that section 219(g) was uncon-
stitutional and that the trust was the appropriate taxpayer.40 Holmes
compared the taxpayer's situation to that of a man who had directed
his bank to pay over income to a servant or friend until further in-
structions were given.41 Holmes pointed out that the only difference
between this hypothetical case and the case before the Court was that
the taxpayer in Bowers had relinquished property title.42 But taxation,
Holmes declared, "is not so concerned with the refinements of title as
it is with actual command over the property taxed-the actual benefit
for which the tax is paid."43 Because the taxpayer held command over
the property (although not its title), Holmes saw no fault in a statute
that deemed the taxpayer taxable on income earned by the trust.
4 4
In Burnet v. Wells,45 Justice Cardozo echoed Justice Holmes's sen-
timents regarding a taxing authority's prerogative to ignore the vagar-
ies of tide and to adroitly focus upon the "right or privilege that is a
partment with its promulgation of the so-called Clifford trust regulations. See infra Part
I.C (discussing the Clifford trust regulations).
34 281 U.S. 376 (1930).
35 Id. at 378.
36 Id. at 377.
87 Id.
38 Revenue Act of 1924, Pub L. No. 68-176, ch. 234, § 219(g), 43 Stat. 253, re-
pealed by Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 1200, 44 Stat. 9, 125-26.
39 "Where the grantor of a trust has, at any time during the taxable year, .. the
power to revest in himself title to any part of the corpus of the trust, then the income
of such part of the trust for such taxable year shall be included in computing the net
income of the grantor." Id. § 219(g), 43 Stat. at 277.





45 289 U.S. 670 (1933).
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constituent of ownership."46 The taxpayer in Wells had established
several irrevocable trusts funded with insurance policies on the life of
the taxpayer.47 The trustee of these trusts was supposed to use the
income generated by the trusts to maintain these insurance policies. 48
Relying upon section 219(h) of the Revenue Act of 1924,49 the gov-
ernment argued that the taxpayer should be taxed on the income
each trust generated that was used to meet insurance premium pay-
ments.50 The taxpayer, however, challenged the constitutionality of
this statute and steadfastly maintained that the trusts should bear the
tax burden on the income earned.51
In his analysis, Justice Cardozo first emphasized the important
role life insurance played in the lives of most people.52 Man), people,
he argued, conceived of maintaining "life insurance as a pressing so-
cial duty. Even if not a duty, it is a common item in the family budget,
kept up very often at the cost of painful sacrifice, and abandoned only
under dire compulsion."53 Whether or not a trust owned the insur-
ance policies, the taxpayer was duty bound to maintain them-just as
he was duty bound to maintain the economic well-being of his own
family5 4 It should have come as no surprise to the taxpayer, Justice
Cardozo insisted, that income used to satisfy an inherent personal ob-
ligation of the taxpayer should remain taxable to him.'
Prior to the promulgation of Treasury regulations and the emer-
gence of the grantor trust rules, the final Supreme Court word on
trust establishment as a source of tax refuge came from Justice Doug-
las. In Helvering v. Clifford,56 the Court was asked to decide whether
the grantor or a trust he had established should report the income
that the trust had earned.57 In Cifford, the taxpayer had established a
five-year trust for the benefit of his wife; the income was to be distrib-
46 Id. at 678.
47 Id. at 673.
48 Id-
49 "Where any part of the income of a trust is or may be applied to the payment
of premiums upon policies of insurance on the life of the grantor .... such part of
the income of the trust shall be included in computing the net income of the gran-
tor." Revenue Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-176, ch. 234, § 219(h), 43 Stat. 253, 277,
repeaed by Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27, 44 Stat. 9, 125-26.
50 289 U.S. at 674.
51 Id-
52 See id. at 681.
53 id
54 See id.
55 Id. at 681-82.
56 309 U.S. 331 (1940).
57 Id. at 334.
20011
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uted or accumulated for her benefit with a reversion of the trust
corpus to the taxpayer. 58 The taxpayer designated himself trustee
and, as trustee, vested himself with an extraordinarily broad range of
fiduciary powers. 59
In both Bowers and Wells, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
had direct statutory authority (section 219(g) and (h) of the Revenue
Act of 1924) to tax the taxpayer on the income the trust earned rather
than the trust he had established. 60 In Clifford, the Commissioner
had no such authority.6' Justice Douglas (and four otherjustices) in-
stead relied on the broad scope of § 22(a) of the Code (the predeces-
sor to Code § 61)62 to declare that the trust's income was taxable to
the taxpayer.6 3 Subject to judicial refinement, 64 this section of the
Code essentially proclaimed that all accretions to wealth were taxa-
ble.65 The terms of the trust, said Justice Douglas, did little to dilute
the taxpayer's dominion and control over the trust property:
Since the income remains in the family and since the husband re-
tains control over the investment, he has rather complete assurance
that the trust will not effect any substantial change in his economic
position. It is hard to imagine that respondent felt himself the
poorer after this trust had been executed or, if he did, that it had
any rational foundation in fact. For as a result of the terms of the
58 Id. at 332.
59 These powers included the power to manage trust property, including the
right (a) to vote trusted shares and to sell, exchange, mortgage, or pledge trust securi-
ties constituting corpus or accumulated income on any terms or for any considera-
tion; (b) to invest cash constituting corpus or accumulated income by making
unsecured loans, by deposits in banks, or by buying securities regardless of their spec-
ulative character, rate of return, or legality for trust funds, and to compromise any
claims held as trustee; and (c) to hold trust property in any name, including his own,
as an individual. Id. at 332-33.
60 See Burnet v. Wells, 289 U.S. 670, 673 (1933); Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376,
377 (1930).
61 See 309 U.S. at 338.
62 I.R.G. § 61 (1994).
63 See 309 U.S. at 338.
64 See, e.g., Helvering v. Indep. Life Ins. Co., 292 U.S. 371, 381 (1934) (holding
that imputed income was not taxable).
65 Revenue Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 216, § 22(a), 48 Stat. 680, 686, repealed by
Revenue Act of 1936, ch. 690, § 1, 49 Stat. 1648, 1652.
[G]ross income includes (all] gains, profits, and income derived ...
from professions, vocations, trades, businesses, commerce, or sales, or deal-
ings in property, whether real or personal, growing out of the ownership or
use of or interest in such property; also from interest, rent, dividends, securi-
ties, or the transaction of any business carried on for gain or profit, or gains
or profits and income derived from any source whatever.
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trust and the intimacy of the familial relationship respondent re-
tained the substance of full enjoyment of all the rights which previ-
ously he had in the property.
66
The Court wvas once again unwilling to follow the paper trail of
property title. Instead, Justice Douglas, like Justices Holmes and Car-
dozo before him, emphasized the importance of practical control over
the transferred trust property rather than " [t] echnical considerations,
niceties of the law of trusts or conveyances, or the legal paraphernalia
which inventive genius may construct...."-67 These other things, Jus-
tice Douglas declared, only obscure the real issue at hand, namely,
whether a taxpayer may still be held liable under the broad taxing
authority of § 22(a) for income earned by a trust.68 In his opinion,
the specifics of the trust's establishment (the length of the trust's
term, the identities of the trustee and the trust beneficiaries, and the
matter of control) amounted to the taxpayer holding dominion and
control over the trust property.69 He felt, therefore, that the taxpayer
should have to bear the trust's attendant tax burdens.
7 0
Clifford was not the last word on the matter of trust taxation. It
was followed by a swelter of commentary-some favorable7 l and some
not72-and numerous inquiries as to its scope.73 In addition, the very
vagueness of the decision opened the floodgates of litigation as both
the government and taxpayers explored Cliffordas application.74
66 309 U.S. at 335-36.
67 Id. at 334.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 335.
70 Id. at 336.
71 E.g., Edmund W. Pavenstedt, The Broadened Scope of Section 22(a): The Evolution
of the Clifford Doctrine; 51 YALE L.J. 213 (1941); see also Roswell Magill, The Supreme
Court on Federal Taxation, 1939-40, 8 U. CHI. L REV. 1, 5 (1940) (describing the CIjF
ford decision as a "desirable" "extension of the income tax statute by the Court").
72 E.g., Frances C. Nash, What Law of Taxation?, 9 Fonrnsst L RE,. 165, 189-90
(1940).
73 E.g., Stanley Surrey, The Supreme Court and the Federal Income Tax: Some Implica-
tions of Recent Decisions, 35 U. ILL. L REv. 779, 797-801 (1941).
74 From the time of the Clifford decision (1940) to the time of the Treasury De-
partment regulations (1945), one of the most litigated issues in the Code u-as whether
the independent existence of a trust should be respected for tax purposes. See Ros-
wellMagill, What Shall Be Done with the Clifford Case?, 45 COLUM. L RE%,. 111, 111
(1944) ("Since 1940, there has been a flood of litigation .... and the end is not at all
in sight."). Learned Hand's comment in Kohnstamr v. Pedrid, 153 F.2d 506, 510 (2d
Cir. 1945), penetrates the nature of the problem:
The test [under Clifford] is impalpable enough at best; but if it is to be
continually refined by successive distinctions, each trifling in itself, shall end
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C. Response of the Treasury Department
The flood of Clifford trust litigation, coupled with the taxpayers'
cries of frustration, stirred the Treasury Department. It promulgated
a set of regulations that are the basis for the present-day grantor trust
rules.
The Clifford trust regulations were precise and pragmatic. If a
particular identifying factor (described below) was present, the trust
was deemed a grantor trust and the taxpayer, not the trust, was taxed
on the trust income. Conversely, if no identifying factor was present,
the trust was deemed a non-grantor trust and thus recognized as a
separate entity for tax purposes.
The newly-issued Clifford trust regulations classified a trust as a
grantor trust if any of the following identifying factors were present:
(1) the corpus or income would or might return to the grantor "after
a relatively short term of years"; (2) "beneficial enjoyment" of the
corpus or income was "subject to a power of disposition" in the gran-
tor or another person lacking a substantial adverse interest in the dis-
position; or (3) the corpus or income was "subject to administrative
control, exercisable primarily" for the grantor's "benefit."75 In its pre-
amble, the Clifford trust regulations declared that the presence of an
identifying factor would "demonstrate the retention by the grantor of
in a morass from which there will be no escape; and the spate of decisions
already poured upon us will be the earnest of eventual utter confusion.
'75 Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.22(a)-21(b) (as amended in 1947). For a detailed analy-
sis of what these regulations said and how they applied, see Maurice Alexandre, A
Case Method Restatement of the New Clifford Regulations, 3 TAx L. REV. 189 (1947).
The obvious source of these categories of circumstances derive from the Clifford
decision and its progeny. For examples where courts found the length of the term
decisive, see Commissionerv. Berolzheimer, 116 F.2d 628, 630 (2d Cir. 1940) (extending
the Clifford "rule" to a ten-year trust), and Fahnestock v. Commissioner, 43 B.T.A. 569,
571 (1941) (holding that the income from a ten-year trust is taxable to the grantor).
For examples where courts held the grantor's retained beneficial enjoyment decisive,
see Brown v. Commissioner, 131 F.2d 640, 641 (3d Cir. 1942) ("We think that a settlor
who is a person of means and who can control the spending of a fund, which she has
set up, in every respect except spending it for herself is sufficiently the 'owner' of the
fund to make its income taxable to her under § 22(a)."), and Morgan v. Commissioner,
2 T.C. 510, 515 (1943) ("To a person of ample means the right to say who shall re-
ceive property and income may be a more important attribute of ownership than the
right to use them for his own well-being."). Finally, for examples where courts held
the grantor's administrative control decisive, see Hall v. Commissionei 150 F.2d 304,
308 (10th Cir. 1945) ("It may be conceded that the power to invest trust funds for the
trustee's personal advantage and benefit is equivalent to the taxable enjoyment of the
trust income .... ."), and Marshall v. Commissioner, 1 T.C. 442, 448-49 (1943) (holding
that where the donor retained certain administrative powers, the Clifford doctrine
applies).
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such complete control of the trust that he is taxable on the income
therefrom under § 22(a)."7 6 Aside from delineating the identifying
factors, the Cifford trust regulations offered several examples of how
this classification process operated.
77
The Clifford trust regulations did not look at the whole picture
surrounding a trust's establishment or its administration. Instead, the
presence of a single identifying factor was deemed sufficient for the
Code to ignore a trust's separate identity for tax purposes. While this
Procrustean approach did not always produce the right result, it did
have the tremendously appealing virtue of offering taxpayers cirtainty
where little or none had existed under Clifford and its progeny.
D. Congressional Endorsement of the Clifford Trust Regulations and
Issuance of the Grantor Trust Rules
In general, the Cifford trust regulations were well-received by tax-
payers, their advisers, and the courts.78 They seemed to have struck
the right balance between protecting legitimate trust arrangements
and inhibiting tax subterfuge. But in the minds of many commenta-
tors, these regulations did not eradicate the myriad of tax controver-
sies that stemmed from trust establishment2
9
In order to "eliminate ... issues of administrative authority and
statutory interpretation," Congress needed to codify the Cifford trust
regulations.80 In addition, the grantor trust rules had two homes: (1)
under the heading "Supplement E-Estates and Trusts," two Code
sections declared a grantor taxable on trust income under certain cir-
76 Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.22(a)-21 (as amended in 1947).
77 Id.
78 See H. Brian Holland et al., A Proposed Revision of the Federal Income Tax Treatment
of Trusts and Estates-American Law Institute Draft, 53 COLUm. L REv. 316, 360 (1953)
("These Regulations were the result of an extensive exploration of the possible solu-
tions, and involved considerable discussion with legal and trust company representa-
tives. The consensus which experience under the Regulations in the intervening
years has produced is that the task of classification was well executed.").
But, as previously stated, not all commentators viewed tie Clifford trust regula-
tions so favorably. See Pavenstedt, supra note 2 (arguing that in promulgating the
Clifford regulations, the Treasury Department overstepped its regulatory powers). In-
deed, soon after the regulations were issued, even the Tax Court found fault with the
Treasury Department's efforts to clarify the scope of the Clifford decision. Estate of
Stockstrom v. Comm'r, 7 T.C. 251, 254 (1946) ("However, the mere change in re-
spondent's administrative construction of the revenue acts of Congress will not result,
as petitioner seems to assume, in the overruling of a line of decisions of this Court
which, to the present time, have the approval of the higher courts.").
79 E.g., Holland et al., supra note 78, at 361.
80 Id.
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cumstances,8l and (2) the Clifford trust regulations under § 22 (a) simi-
larly declared a grantor taxable on trust income under certain other
circumstances.8 2 The statutory and regulatory laws were so similar in
nature that sound logic dictated that Congress should integrate them.
In 1954, Congress conducted a massive overhaul of the 1939
Code.8 3 Congress used this opportunity to consolidate the rules relat-
ing to trust taxation and, in so doing, gave the Clifford trust regula-
tions its imprimatur by using them as the substantive basis for what are
now commonly known as the grantor trust rules.
84
In transforming the Clifford trust regulations into statutory law,
Congress greatly improved trust taxation certainty. First, Congress
made the grantor trust rules the exclusive mechanism to evaluate the
independent existence of a trust; no longer would the Service be able
to use the broad scope of other tax statutes to challenge whether a
trust was the responsible taxpayer.85 Second, Congress integrated the
grantor trust rules under Subpart E of SubchapterJ of the Code; no
longer would these rules have to be gleaned from different places in
the Code or Treasury regulations.8 6 Finally, Congress offered elabo-
rate detail regarding the tax consequences that would result from
grantor trust classification; no longer would the focus of grantor trust
classification be strictly upon trust income-their breadth would ex-
tend to deductions and credits against tax as well.8 7
These new grantor trust rules required little conceptual explana-
tion. The separate existence of a trust was to be ignored when "the
grantor or another person has retained substantial dominion or con-
trol" over trust property.88 The concept and need for grantor trust
status was easily understood, but the challenge was how to define do-
minion and control in the context of a trust arrangement. The next
Part of this Article explores the congressional response to this
challenge.
81 See I.R.C. §§ 166 (taxing income generated by a revocable trust to the grantor),
167 (taxing income generated by a trust for the grantor's benefit to the grantor)
(1939) (current version at I.R.C. §§ 676-677 (1994)).
82 See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
83 See generally Roswell Magill & Henry W. de Kosiman, The Internal Revenue Code of
1954: Income, Deductions, Gains and Losses, 68 HAzv. L. Rxv. 201 (1954) (surveying
changes to federal tax law enacted by the Internal Revenue Code of 1954).
84 See I.R.C. §§ 671-679 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
85 See id. § 671 (1994) (last sentence).
86 See id. §§ 671-679 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
87 See id. § 671 (1994) (first sentence).
88 Treas. Reg. § 1.671-2(b) (1960).
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II. TnE GRANTOR TRUST RuLEs AND THEm PAST AND
PRESENT EFFECTIVENESS
This Part first summarizes the grantor trust rules and how and
when they apply, and submits that they were generally effective in
yielding their intended goal, namely safeguarding the progressive rate
structure of the income tax.89 Next, this Part shows why many taxpay-
ers now favor grantor trust status, and why, from a tax policy perspec-
tive, this is an unsettling phenomenon.
A. The Grantor Trust Rules and Their Past Effectiveness
The Code sets forth the grantor trust rules in the following man-
ner (1) Code § 671 describes the tax repercussions that stem from
grantor trust status,90 (2) Code § 672 defines certain terms of art that
are integral to the grantor trust rules,91 and (3) Code §§ 673-679
identify those trust characteristics that cause a taxpayer to hold do-
minion and control of all or a portion of a trust.
9 -
1. Code § 671: Tax Repercussions Associated with Grantor Trust
Status
Code § 671 makes a trust instrument function like a spaghetti col-
ander. All income, deductions, and credits against tax of a trust are
poured in. If a taxpayer is treated as having dominion and control
over all or a portion of a trust, then items of income, deductions, and
credits against tax attributable to such ownership remain in the spa-
ghetd colander and the taxpayer must take them into account in com-
puting the taxpayer's taxes.9 3 The balance of income, deductions,
and credits against tax drain through the spaghetti colander and are
taxed to the trust or trust beneficiaries in accordance with the non-
89 This Article discusses the salient features of the grantor trust rules, highlight-
ing their encompassing nature. For a detailed exposition of specific grantor trust
rules, see M. CARR FERGUSON ET AL, FEDERAL INco,%m TAXATION OF ESTATES, TRUSTS, &
BENEFiCLARES 10-1 to 10-122 (3d ed. 1998).
90 See I.RCF § 671 (1994).
91 See id. § 672 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
92 See id. §§ 673-679. Sometimes a person other than the grantor is treated as
owner of all or a portion of a trust. See id. § 678(a) (1994). These beneficiary-con-
trolled trusts are often known as Mallinckrodt trusts, named after the first case in
which someone other than the trust's grantor was treated as haing dominion and
control over the assets of the trust, Mallinckrodt v. Nunan, 146 F.2d 1 (8th Cir. 1945).
For further details regarding beneficiary-controlled trusts, see infra notes 125-27 and
accompanying text.
93 See I.R.C. § 671 (1994). For a discussion of the less obvious tax ramifications
that stem from grantor trust status, see generally Ascher, supra note 3.
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grantor trust taxation rules established under SubchapterJ, exclusive
of Subpart E.
94
Despite the emphasis the grantor trust rules place on the term
"portion," nowhere is this term defined in Subpart E. Treasury regu-
lations, however, offer guidance-albeit incomplete-as to its mean-
ing.95 In certain instances, the taxpayer is deemed to own a "vertical
portion" of the trust (for example, the income or corpus portions of
the trust). 96 In other instances, the taxpayer is deemed to own a "hor-
izontal portion" of the trust (for example, a fraction or pecuniary por-
tion of the trust, or sometimes even a specific trust asset).97
There are various tax reporting requirements that apply once the
presence of grantor trust status has been determined and all or a por-
tion of trust ownership is attributed to the grantor. In general, these
reporting requirements instruct that the "spaghetti" be removed from
the colander and, if this metaphor can be carried one step further,
that it be "served" on the grantor's tax return.98
94 See I.R.C. § 671. For an exhaustive discussion of how trusts that are not subject
to Subpart E are taxed, see JOHN L. PEsctmL & EDWARD D. SPURGEON, FEDERAL TMA-
TiON OF TRUSTS, GRANTORS AND BENEFICIAimES 3-1 to 3-68 (3d ed. 1997). For a nice
summary of how these rules operate, see Jeffrey G. Sherman, All You Really Need to
Know About SubchapterJ You Learned from This Article, 63 Mo. L. REV. 1, 12-14 (1998).
95 For the most thorough analysis of the meaning of the term "portion" and the
tax implications associated with this concept, see Leo L. Schmolka, Selected Aspects of
the Grantor Trust Rules, 9 INST. ON EsT. PLAN. 1400 (1975).
96 See Treas. Reg. § 1.671-3(b) (as amended in 1969). For example, suppose a
taxpayer establishes an irrevocable trust. The terms of the trust instruct the trustee to
pay the taxpayer income for life and to distribute the remainder to the taxpayer's son.
Under the regulations, the taxpayer would be deemed to own only the income por-
tion of the trust. See id. § 1.671-3(b) (1).
97 See id. § 1.671-3(a) (3). For example, suppose a taxpayer establishes an irrevo-
cable trust. The terms of the trust instruct the trustee to pay current income to the
taxpayer's children and, in the year 2010, to distribute the remainder in equal shares
to the taxpayer's children. The taxpayer, however, reserves the discretionary right to
reacquire one-quarter of the trust assets. Under the regulations, the taxpayer would
be deemed to own one-quarter of the trust's income and corpus. Id. § 1.671-3(a) (2).
98 For a detailed analysis of the reporting requirements of grantor trusts, see
Stanard T. Klinefelter, IRS Issues New Reporting Requirements for Grantor Trusts, 22 AM,
C. TR. & EST. CouNs. NomS 171 (1996).
Note that in instances where the grantor is considered the owner of all the tnist
property (for example, where the trust is revocable), the trust is ignored entirely for
income-tax reporting purposes. More specifically, the trustee may elect to furnish the
name and taxpayer identification number of the grantor and the address of the trust
to all payers during the taxable year. Treas. Reg. § 1.671-4(b) (1)-(2) (1996). Under
this reporting election, the trust is completely transparent, leaving the trustee with no
independent reporting obligations to the Service.
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2. Code § 672: Defined Terms of Art
In formulating the grantor trust rules, Congress realized that tax-
payers might attempt to camouflage their continued stake in the con-
tributed trust property.99 For example, a taxpayer may have a family
member serve as a trustee who has decision-making authority with re-
spect to the trust property. Congress instituted Code § 672 in an at-
tempt to determine the degree of allegiance a party will have to the
grantor. 00 In theory, the closer the degree of allegiance, the more
likely a party will conform to the grantor's demands.
On one end of the allegiance spectrum there is what is known as
an "adverse party." An "adverse party" is "any person having a substan-
tial beneficial interest in the trust which would be adversely affected
by the exercise or nonexercise of the power which he possesses re-
specting the trust."101 Essentially, an adverse party and the grantor
have conflicting interests. To illustrate, suppose Father establishes a
trust for the benefit of Daughter and suppose further that Father re-
tains the right to revoke the trust, but only with Daughter's consent.
Because Daughter has an economic stake in maintaining rather than
permitting its revocation, the Code classifies Daughter as an adverse
party.10 2 This remains true even though Daughter might be willing to
accede to Father's demands.'
03
The Code considers the grantor's spouse, on the other hand, to
be a nonadverse party. Code § 672 makes the categorical assumption
that a grantor and the grantor's spouse have interests that coincide.
Therefore, when analyzing a grantor's beneficial interest in a trust,
the Code assumes that the grantor has any power or interest held by
the grantor's spouse.10 4
99 See, e.g., Barker v. Comm'r, 25 T.C. 1230, 1234 (1956) (holding that parents
who served as trustess for a trust established for the benefit of their son and who held
a remote contingency interest in the trust assets did not hold a substantial adverse
interest).
100 See S. REP. No. 72-665, at 34-35 (1932) (stating that a so-called "adverse party"
must be more than a mere beneficiary "having a very minor interest").
101 I.R.C. § 672(a) (1994).
102 This fact pattern illustrates a case when a party holds an adverse interest as to
the entire trust. There are cases when a party holds an adverse interest as to only a
portion of a trist Suppose Father had three other children and suppose further that
Father could only revoke Daughter's one-quarter trust interest ith her approval.
Under these assumed facts, Daughter would be deemed to have a one-quarter adverse
interest as to the whole trust. See Treas. Reg. § 1.672(a)-l(b) (1960).
103 See id. § 1.672(a)-l(a).
104 See I.R.G. § 672(c) (1) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
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Parties who are not the grantor's spouse and who have no eco-
nomic stake in the trust are also considered nonadverse parties.10 -
More specifically, nonadverse parties who are not the grantor's spouse
are presumed to have interests that coincide with the grantor, if they
are "related" (for example, a parent of the grantor) or "subordinate"
to the grantor (for example, a bank that is wholly owned by the gran-
tor).1° 6 Depending upon the circumstances, these parties may be
treated as acting for, or on behalf of, the grantor. If, however, the
nonadverse parties are not related or subordinate to the grantor, such
parties are deemed to have the trust beneficiaries' interests, rather
than the grantor's interests, at heart, and the grantor trust rules thus
treat these nonadverse parties as independent. 10 7
In sum, the terms "adverse," "nonadverse," and "independent"
help identify those persons or entities that would be beholden to the
grantor and prone to act as the grantor's surrogate.
3. Code §§ 673-679: Grantor Trust Status Defined
In formulating the grantor trust rules, Congress attempted to dis-
tinguish between those taxpayers who established trusts as a device to
minimize their income taxes from those who established trusts as a
means of providing legitimate asset management 08 But in making
this distinction, Congress long ago recognized the obvious: "The con-
clusion is inescapable that irrevocable inter vivos trusts usually are cre-
ated primarily to save taxes and in forms dictated by tax
considerations. They are part of a nationwide adventure in tax
avoidance."' 0 9
With the intent of curbing the use of trusts as a tax minimization
device, Congress sought to make grantor trust status the norm for in-
ter vivos trusts rather than the exception, thereby eliminating a tax-
105 See id. § 672(b) (1994).
106 There is a rebuttable presumption (that can only be overcome by a preponder-
ance of evidence) that certain "related or subordinate parties" are subservient to the
grantor. Id. § 672(c) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). In addition to the grantor's spouse,
the term "related or subordinate parties" includes "[t]he grantor's father, mother,
issue, brother or sister, an employee of the grantor; a corporation or any employee of
a corporation in which the stock holdings of the grantor and the trust are significant
from the viewpoint of voting control; a subordinate employee of a corporation in
which the grantor is an executive." Id. § 672(c) (2).
107 Treas. Reg. § 1.674(c)-i (1960).
108 See Sherwin Kamin, Stanley S. Surrey & William C. Warren, The Internal Revenue
Code of 1954: Trusts, Estates and Beneficiaries, 54 CoLUM. L. REv. 1237, 1259-60 (1954).
109 David Westfall, Trust Grantors and Section 674: Adventures in Income Tax Avoid-
ance, 60 COLUM. L. REV. 326, 326 (1960).
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payer's ability to shift income to another taxpayer whose income was
subject to a lower marginal tax rate. A section-by-section analysis of
the grantor trust rules reveals this strategic approach.
Code § 673 represents the codification (with some refinement)
of the Clfford decision.110 It classifies as a grantor trust any trust (or
portion thereof) in which a grantor directly or indirectly holds a re-
versionary interest' 111 There are only two instances when this rule will
not apply: (1) if the value of the reversionary interest does not exceed
five percent of the value of the property interest which ultimately re-
verts to the grantor," 2 and (2) if the interest reverts to the grantor
upon the death, prior to age twenty-one, of a minor lineal descendent
who is a beneficiary of such trust.1 13
Code § 674 classifies as a grantor trust any trust (or portion
thereof) over which a grantor or nonadverse party can dictate benefi-
cial enjoyment, unless the terms of the trust require the approval or
consent of an adverse party." 4 On its surface, this rule would make
virtually every trust a grantor trust, because rarely would a grantor vest
an adverse party with any powers. There are, however, three impor-
tant exceptions to this grantor trust rule that curb its potentially ex-
pansive application." 5
110 See I.R.G. § 673 (1994). See supra notes 56-70 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the Clifford decision.
111 I.R.C. § 673(a). To illustrate, suppose a grantor establishes a trust. The terms
of the trust provide income to the grantor's son for a period of five years, and
Friendly National Bank is named as trustee. At the end of the five-year term, trust
principal reverts to the grantor. The Code would classify this trust as a grantor trust,
-because the value of the reversionary interest exceeds five percent of the value of the
property contributed to the trust. See id.
112 Id.
113 Id. § 673(b).
114 I& § 674(a). To ilustrate, suppose a grantor establishes a trust. The terms of
the trust provide income to the grantor's three minor children until they all reach
majority age, at which time trust principal will be divided equally among the grantor's
children. Assume that the grantor also reserves the right to sprinkle income and prin-
cipal between and among his children. Under these circumstances, the Code would
classify this trust as a grantor trust, because the grantor retains the power to control
beneficial enjoyment. See id. For a detailed exposition of this rule, see James B.
Levis, Powers Retained by the Settler of a Trhst: Their Income, Estate and Gift Tax Treatment,
5 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 1, 5-12 (1970); Eduard W. Turley, Jr., Section 674: Mr.
Clifford's Enigmatic Progeny, 9 Hous. L. Rxv. 928, 929-30 (1972); Wesifall, supra note
109, at 330-32.
115 The first exception provides that certain restrictive forms of beneficial control
can be held by anyone, including the grantor, without the Code classifying such trust
as a grantor trust. I.R.C. § 674(b) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). These forms of beneficial
control include the following. the power to apply income to support a dependent, id.
§ 674(b)(1) (1994), a postponed power affecting beneficial enjoyment, id.
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Code § 675 deems the grantor to be the owner of all or the por-
tion of a trust in which the grantor holds certain administrative pow-
ers116 including: (1) administrative powers held by the grantor or
nonadverse party that potentially threaten a trust beneficiary's eco-
nomic stake in the trust117 and (2) administrative powers held by any
person in a nonfiduciary capacity that reflect the grantor's continuing
dominion and control over trust property. 118
§ 674(b) (2), a power exercisable only by will (other than a power in the grantor to
appoint by will the income of the trust where the income is accumulated by such
disposition by the grantor or may be so accumulated in the discretion of the grantor
or a nonadverse party, or both, without the approval or consent of any adverse party),
id. § 674(b) (3), a power to allocate among charitable beneficiaries, id. § 674(b) (4)
(Supp. IV 1998), a power to distribute corpus (a) to or for one or more beneficiaries,
provided that the power is limited by a reasonably definite standard which is set forth
in the trust instrument, or (b) to or for any current income beneficiary, provided that
the distribution of corpus must be chargeable against the proportionate share of
corpus held in trust for the payment of income to the beneficiary as if the corpus
constituted a separate trust enjoyment, id § 674(b) (5) (1994), a power to withhold
income temporarily, i& § 674(b) (6), a power to withhold income during disability of
a beneficiary, id § 674(b) (7), and a power to allocate between corpus and income, Ud,
§ 674(b) (8).
The second exception provides that anyone other than the grantor or the gran-
tor's spouse can hold the power to allocate income, if limited by an ascertainable
standard. Id. § 674(d).
The third exception provides that so-called independent trustees can hold virtu-
ally any power over trust income or corpus, including the right, in their complete
discretion, to sprinkle income and principal as they deem appropriate. Id. § 674(c).
A single trustee is independent if the trustee is not a related or subordinate party who
is subservient to the wishes of the grantor; multiple trustees are independent if no
more than half of them are related or subservient to the wishes of the grantor. Id.
116 Id. § 675. To illustrate, suppose a grantor establishes a trust for the benefit of
his daughter, but reserves the right to borrow trust funds free of interest. The Code
would classify this trust as a grantor trust, because the grantor had retained adminis-
trative control of the trust assets. Id. § 675(2).
117 These include (i) the power to deal for less than adequate and full security, id.
§ 675(1), (ii) a power to borrow without adequate interest or security, id. § 675(2),
and (iii) the actual borrowing of trust funds (except where an independent party
serves as trustee), i. § 675(3).
118 Administrative powers that are exercisable in a nonfiduciary capacity include
the following: (i) a power to vote or direct the voting of stock or other securities of a
corporation in which the holdings of the grantor and the trust are significant from
the viewpoint of voting control, id. § 675(4) (A), (ii) a power to control the invest-
ment of the trust funds either by directing investments or reinvestments, or by vetoing
proposed investments or reinvestments, to the extent that the trust funds consist of
stocks or securities of corporations in which the holdings of the grantor and the trust
are significant from the viewpoint of voting control, id. § 675(4) (B), and (iii) a power
to reacquire the trust corpus by substituting other property of equivalent value, id.
§ 675(4) (C).
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Code § 676 accords grantor trust status over all or a portion of a
trust where the grantor, a nonadverse party, or both can vest title to
trust property back in the grantor.1 9 The origin of Code § 676 pre-
dates the issuance of the Clifford trust regulations. 120 Long ago, Con-
gress determined that a grantor held dominion and control over trust
property, if the grantor, directly or indirectly, held a trust revocation
right'
2 '
Code § 677 categorizes the grantor as having dominion and con-
trol over any portion of a trust when the trust's income is or may be
(1) distributed to the grantor or the grantor's spouse, (2) held or ac-
cumulated for future distribution to the grantor or the grantor's
spouse, or (3) applied to the payment of life insurance premiums for
the grantor or the grantor's spouse (except those policies irrevocably
payable to charities).122 In addition, the grantor will also be treated as
owner of the income used to pay the grantor's support obligations. 123
Like Code § 676, the origins of Code § 677 predate the grantor trust
rules. It, too, is based upon congressional recognition that trusts that
function like personal bank accounts should be taxed as such. 2 4
Code § 678 is an extension of the grantor trust rules. It provides
that a person other than a grantor will be treated as having dominion
and control over any portion of a trust, if he alone can vest the corpus
or the income of any portion of a testamentary or inter vivos trust in
himself.'2 5 This rule does not apply if (a) the grantor is taxable on
the income the trust generates12 6 or (b) the only right such person
119 Id. § 676(a). To illustrate, suppose a grantor establishes a trust. The terms of
the trust provide income and corpus distributions for the benefit of the grantor's
daughter. In addition, the grantor reserves the right, in his discretion, to revoke the
trust. The Code would dassify this trust as a grantor trust, because the grantor holds a
trust revocation power. See id.
120 See supra notes 38-39.
121 See id
122 I.RGC. § 677(a) (1994). To illustrate, suppose a grantor establishes a trust. The
terms of the trust permit the trustee to make discretionary distributions of income
and corpus to the grantor, during his lifetime, and, upon his death, the principal of
the trust passes to the grantor's son. The Code would classify this trust as a grantor
trust because the income and corpus of this trust could be expended to or for the
grantor's benefit. See id.
123 Id. § 677(b).
124 See supra note 49.
125 I.R.C. § 678(a) (1994). To illustrate, suppose a grantor establishes a trust. The
terms of the trust provide the grantor's daughter with the annual right to wvithdraw all
the income and principal of the trust. The Code would classify this trust as a grantor
trust, and the daughter would be taxed on the income of the trust See id.
126 Id. § 678(b).
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has is to apply trust income to discharge a support obligation, but
such person does not exercise this right.
127
Code § 679 is a late addition to the grantor trust rules. 128 Instead
of attempting to identify characteristics of dominion and control for
grantor trust analysis purposes, it classifies as a grantor trust any por-
tion of a foreign trust established by a United States person to the
extent that there is a United States beneficiary of any portion of such
trust.
129
As codified, the grantor trust rules were designed as a bulwark in
the defense of the Code's progressive rate structure. 30 And for the
next thirty or so years after their introduction, the grantor trust rules
served this role and served it well.' 31 Grantors who attempted to use
trusts as a device to shift income would, if audited, have to overcome
the grantor trust rules. In the vast majority of cases, the Service frus-
trated taxpayers' income-shifting attempts. 132 Even in those rare in-
stances when grantors tried to use grantor trust status to their own
advantage, their efforts were rebuffed by the courts and the Service
133
127 Id. § 678(c).
128 Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1013, 90 Stat. 1520, 1616-17
(codified as amended at I.R.C. § 679 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998)).
129 I.R.C. § 679(a) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
130 See Ascher, supra note 3, at 281.
131 See Howard M. Zaritsky, The Hollow Crown? What's Left of Grantor Trust, 21 INST.
ON EsT. PLAN. 1500 (1987) ("Estate planners have grown to think of the grantor
trust rules ... as a series of traps and obstacles which one must traverse in order to
create a trust that is a separate taxable entity.").
132 E.g., Carson v. Comm'r, 92 T.C. 1134, 1137 (1989) (holding that grantor trust
status applied when the grantor retained spray power over trust income); Wysong v.
Comm'r, 57 T.C.M. (P-H) 1725, 1727 (1988) (treating a grantor as owner of a trust by
virtue of his demand right to trust corpus and his complete control over the benefi-
cial enjoyment of trust corpus); Braun v. Comm'r, 53 T.C.M. (P-H) 1116, 1119 (1984)
taxing a grantor on all trust income used to meet the educational costs of the gran-
tor's minor and adult children).
133 Prior to the significant changes made by the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L.
No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.), to
the Code's progressive rate structure and its application, several commentators pro-
moted the virtues of using grantor trusts in conjunction with tax shelters. They
thought that grantor trusts, rather than individual investors, were the appropriate
parties to invest in tax shelters. When the tax shelter did not produce any losses, the
grantor would then release the power(s) that led the trust to being classified as a
grantor trust. If all went according to plan, the tax burdens associated with the dispo-
sition of tax shelter interests would befall the trust, as a non-grantor trust, rather than
the grantor. See generally George Brode, Jr., Tax Shelter Problem Areas-Potential Deprei-
ation Recapture on Death of a Partner, Phantom Gain, and the Defective Trust Gambit, 54
TAX ES 306 (1976) (advocating the possible use of these trusts as a mechanism to mini-
mize income tax); Martin B. Cowan, Use of Grantor Trusts to Escape a Tax Shelter Without
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and foiled by legislative initiatives.134
B. Grantor Thtst Rules and Their Present Effectiveness
A review of judicial controversies over the last ten years might
lead one to conclude that the grantor trust rules continue to enjoy
unprecedented success. Indeed, there is not a single case involving a
post-1991 fact pattern in which the Service has invoked the grantor
trust rules. This absence ofjudicial activity might signify that the gran-
tor trust rules cast such a harsh shadow on the use of trusts as a tax
minimization device that they are no longer employed as such.
But drawing such an optimistic conclusion would be foolhardy.
Although tax advisors were at one time careful to avoid the "trap" of
grantor trust status, today the opposite is true. In a major role rever-
sal, many tax advisors are using the same care on behalf of some of
their clients, but this time to ensure that the trusts their clients estab-
lish are "defective" for tax purposes.
The Tax Reform Act of 1986135 made vast changes to the progres-
sive rate structure of the income tax and its application.13, As a result
of these changes, grantor trust status no longer carries the same bur-
dens it once did; to the contrary, grantor trust status now often offers
taxpayers a refuge, making its invocation by the Service almost alw-ays
pointless.
Detrimental Tax Effects, 41J. TAX'N 346 (1974) (same); Burton W. Kanter, Supplementay
Comment on the -Defective Trust Gambit, -54 TAXES 686 (1976) (same).
The Treasury Department, however, issued a revenue ruling specifically stating
that a change of trust status constituted a recognition event to the grantor. Rev. Rul.
77-402, 1977-2 C.B. 222. This position was subsequently affirmed in Treas. Reg.
§ 1.1001-2(c), ex. 5 (1980), and upheld by the Tax Court in Madorin v. Commissioner,
84 T.C. 667 (1985). See Michael A. Levin, Grantor Trusts in Real Estate Transactions, 13
J. REAL EST. TAx'N 108, 108 (1985) ("[The Madorin case] sound[s] the death knell for
the grantor trust as a tax shelter escape vehicle.").
134 Congress eliminated the deduction for personal interest in 1986. Pub. L No.
99-514, § 511(b), 100 Stat. 2085, 2246 (1986) (codified at I.R.C. § 163(h) (1994 &
Supp. IV 1998)). Prior to this, othenise deductible interest payments with respect to
life insurance policies often went unused on the income tax returns of trusts, because
these trusts did not generate adequate income. To obviate this problem, tax advisors
thought that grantor trusts would permit grantors to command such deductions on
their returns. SeeJerry W. Wark, IRS Rulings Hint "Super" Lfe Insurance Trust Oa)y for
Gift, Income and Estate Tax Savings, 54J. TAX'N 162, 164-66 (1981); Ralph M. Engel &
Linda R. Regenstreich, The 'Super Trst'--Estate PlanningforLfe Insurance, TR. & Esr.,
Feb. 1982, at 61, 65.
135 Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
136 See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.
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A simple example illustrates this point. Consider a trust that
holds title to a million dollars worth of bonds that generate $100,000
of interest. If the Code recognizes this trust as a non-grantor trust, the
tax liability on the interest in 2000 would be $38,622 (assuming no
distribution deduction).' 3 7 If, instead, the Code classifies the trust as
a grantor trust, the tax liability on the interest in 2000 would be
$22,300 (assuming the grantor had no other sources of income and
files ajoint income tax return). 38 The difference in outcomes is due
to the fact that trust income earned by a non-grantor trust is taxed
under a highly compressed rate structure.139 In contrast, income
earned by a grantor trust is subject to the grantor's more graduated
rate structure. 40 The difference between the two rate structures al-
most always leaves taxpayers and their families financially better off, if
they establish grantor trusts.
In addition to the newfound tax rate advantage associated with
the use of grantor trusts, other tax minimization opportunities are
available: (1) the use of grantor trust status to minimize a grantor's
gift, estate, and generation-skipping transfer tax burdens (collectively
hereinafter referred to as "transfer taxes") and (2) the use of grantor
trust status to minimize a grantor's (or a grantor's heirs') income tax
burdens.
1. Grantor Trust Use to Minimize Transfer Taxes
The courts have concluded that "income tax provisions are not to
be construed as though they were in pan materia" with transfer tax
statutes. 141 What this means is that the rules and definitions for one
tax system will not dictate the rules and definitions of the other tax
system and vice versa. 142 Each system of taxation, for example, has
137 I.R.C. § 1(e) (West Supp. 2000).
138 Id. § 1 (a).
139 Id. § 1 (e).
140 M § 1 (a).
141 Farid-Es-Sultaneh v. Comm'r, 160 F.2d 812,814 (2d Cir. 1947); see also Lockard
v. Comm'r, 166 F.2d 409, 412 (lst Cir. 1948) ("[Flor the most part any correlation
that may exist between the three [income, estate, and gift] taxes is 'purely
coincidental.'").
142 Despite commentators' pleas that Congress harmonize the income and trans
fer systems of taxation, their recommendations have largely been ignored. See, e.g.,
Erwin N. Griswold, A Plan for the Coordination of the Income, Estate, and Gift Tax Provi-
sions with Respect to Trusts and Other Transfers, 56 HARv. L. REv. 337, 342-52 (1942).
This absence of coordination continues to draw attack from commentators. See, e.g.,
John L. Peschel, The Impact of Fiduciary Standards on Federal Taxation of Grantor Truts:
Illusion and Inconsistency, 1979 DutE LJ. 709, 709 ("When applied to inter vivos trusts,
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developed a different concept of the term "control."143 Consider, for
example, the tax consequences to a taxpayer who makes a property
contribution to a trust. For transfer tax purposes, this contribution
may constitute a completed gift that is excluded from the taxpayer's
gross estate; conversely, for income tax purposes, the taxpayer may
maintain enough indicia of dominion and control over the trust prop-
erty to remain liable for the income such trust property generates.
144
Tax advisers have seized upon the inconsistencies between these
two tax systems as mechanisms to alleviate their clients' transfer tax
burdens. They have had their clients establish wealth maximization
trusts,4 5 institute special forms of installment sales, 146 and engage in
federal income, estate and gift tax rules often produce uncoordinated-at times un-
predictable-tax consequences.").
143 Compare I.PC. §§ 673-679 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998), with I.R.C. §§ 2036-2044
(1994).
144 See infra Part III.A
145 Wealth maximization trusts involve a simple strategy: a grantor establishes a
trust for the benefit of his intended beneficiaries that qualifies for grantor trust status,
but the terms of this trust do not cause the trust-held property to be includible in the
grantor's gross estate. The grantor trust status of the trust makes the grantor liable
for tax on any income the trust generates. This produces significant transfer tax sav-
ings to the grantor and the grantor's intended beneficiaries, because the trust ac-
cumulates income without diminishment related to taxes. Se Roth, supra note 13, 1
406.1 (showing in present value terms that this technique offers taxpayers significant
transfer tax savings).
To illustrate, suppose a grantor funds an irrevocable trust with cash of $100,000
that yields a 10% annual return. Suppose further that the effective individual income
tax rate is 30% and the effective trust income tax rate is 40%. If the trust is a grantor
trust, the grantor will pay $3000 of tax, leaving $110,000 in trust ($100,000 initial
contribution plus $10,000 return). If the trust is a non-grantor trust, the trust will
bear a $4000 tax burden, leaving only $106,000 in trust ($100,000 plus $10,000 return
less $4000 tax). In addition to the income tax savings of $1000 ($4000 - $3000), the
transfer tax savings from employing this technique are even more dramatic. In just
the first year, $4000 of additional wealth remains in trust. Were the estate tax rate
55%, this would save $2200 in transfer taxes ($4000 x .55) in one year versus a trust
that does not qualify for grantor trust status. Over time, the tax savings and the addi-
tional wealth that can pass to the grantor's heirs can be extraordinary.
146 Tax advisors now exploit grantor trust status in the context of installment sales
to circumvent the special valuation rules provided under Chapter 14 of the Code. See,
e.g., Burton W. Kanter & Michael J. Legamaro, The Grantor Trust: Handmaiden to the
IRS and Servant to the Taxpayer, 75 TAXEs 706, 755-59 (1997); Mulligan, supra note 13,
1510.
By way of background, Chapter 14's Code § 2702 generally provides that, vith
respect to any transfer into trust, the alue of any retained interest held by the grantor
in such trust will be zero, unless the interest retained is "qualified." I.RtC. § 2702(a)
(1994 & Supp. IV 1998). A qualified interest includes the right to a fixed annual
amount or a fixed annual percentage of trust-held property. Id. § 2702(b). 1%hile
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this special valuation rule has not eliminated grantors making trust contributions with
retained interests, see, e.g., Lawrence P. Katzenstein, Running the Numbers: An Economic
Analysis of GRATS and QPRTS, 32 INsT. ON EsT. PLAN. 1400, 1402 (1998); Carlyn S.
McCaffrey & Pam H. Schneider, Trimming Transfer Taxes with Split-interest Transfers:
GRATS and QPRT, in VALUATION, TAXATION AND PLANNING TECHNIQUES FOR SOPHISrI-
CATFD ESTATES 101 (Practicing Law Inst. 1999), grantors are less inclined to do so.
The reason for this reluctance is twofold. First, the value of the grantor's retained
interest in the trust is determined under Code § 7520. This rate is equal to 120% of
the federal midterm rate in effect under Code § 1274(d) (1) on the date of the gift.
I.R.C. § 7520(a) (2) (1994). Unless the trust-held property produces a net return in
excess of the rate posited under Code § 7520 (which may be very difficult to achieve),
a transfer under Code § 2702 will not meet its intended tax result. Second, should
the grantor die during the period in which the grantor has a retained interest, some
or possibly all of the trust-held property is includible in the grantor's estate. I.R.S.
Field Service Advisory 2000-36-012 (May 25, 2000) (concluding that the entire corpus
of a GRAT is includible in the grantor's estate under Code § 2039(b) where the gran-
tor had died during the GRAT's term); see also I.R.C. § 2036(a) (1994); Rev. Rul. 82-
105, 1982-1 C.B. 133 (addressing the amount includible in the estate of a grantor-
annuitant under a charitable remainder trust; holding that the includible amount is
that portion of the trust principal necessary to produce the annuity amount using the
applicable discount rate (now the Code § 7520 rate) for the month of the grantor's
death).
Rather than transfer property into a trust and subject the property to the special
valuation rules under Chapter 14 of the Code, creative tax advisors have devised a new
planning technique. Under this technique, a grantor establishes a grantor trust that
is effective to avoid estate tax inclusion. The trust is funded with a small initial cash
contribution. The grantor then sells property to the trustee of the trust. The trustee
of the trust pays for the property by making a small cash down payment and issuing a
promissory note equal to the balance due. Interest on the note is paid on a current
basis and a balloon payment of principal is due at the end of an agreed-upon term.
The interest rate set on the note is usually equal to the current federal rate estab-
lished under Code § 1274. (This rate will vary depending on the term length of the
promissory note.)
If all goes according to plan, this technique offers several benefits. First, the
grantor status of the trust permits the sale itself to be ignored. See Rev. Rul. 85-13,
1985-1 C.B. 184. Thus, the grantor does not have to recognize the gain, if any, associ-
ated with the sale of the property. Second, any interest payments made by the trust to
the grantor can likewise be ignored and need not be included in income, because
under the grantor trust rules, a grantor cannot loan money to herself. Priv. Ltr. Rul.
95-35-026 (May 31, 1995). Third, the interest rate chargeable under the terms of the
installment arrangement is that which is required under Code § 1274 (the Code sec-
tion that controls in the context of a sale). This rate is generally less than that which
would be imposed were Code § 7520 applicable (the Code section that controls for
purposes of computing the grantor's retained interest under Code § 2702). See Fra-
zee v. Comm'r, 98 T.C. 554, 587-90 (1992) (holding that the value of a promissory
note given in exchange for the sale of property was to be determined under Code
§ 7872, which incorporates through Code § 7872(f) (2) the interest rate under Code
§ 1274). Fourth, should the grantor die while the promissory note is outstanding, the
amount included in the deceased grantor's estate would not be the fair market value
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trust loans, 147 all in an effort to exploit the grantor trust rules. The
effectiveness of these techniques depends upon two factors: (1) the
income tax savings or costs associated with grantor trust status and (2)
the transfer tax savings that inure to the trust beneficiaries by the
grantor's payment of tax on trust income. Because non-grantor trust
income is taxed under the compressed rate structure of Code § l(e),
and the grantor's income tax payments are not subject to gift tax,' 48 it
is a rare occasion when it does not make sense to secure grantor trust
StatuS.
1 4 9
of the trust-held property, but rather would be limited to the fair market value of the
unpaid balance of the promissory note. See Rev. Rul. 77-193, 1977-1 C.B. 273 (ruling
that the value of property sold for the promissory note is not includible in the dece-
dent's estate under Code § 2036(a) (1)).
At least one commentator contends that the installment sale technique does not
work, see Brendan P. Smith, A Sale to an Entity Trust III Have Better Results Than a Sale
to an Intentionally Defective Grantor Trust or a Transfer to a GRAT, 23 TAx MG.%r. EST.
GFTrs & Ta. J. 86 (1998) (arguing that the sale constitutes a non-event because the
transfer does not constitute a gift for transfer tax purposes and is ignored for income
tax purposes), but the vast majority of other commentators think otherwise. See, e.g.,
Mulligan, supra note 13, 1500 n.1 (citing Kanter & Legamaro, supra, at 755-59; H.
Allan Shore & Craig T. McClung, Beyond the Basic SUPERFREZE-An Update and Addi-
tional Planning Opportunities, 75 TAxEs 41 (1997)).
147 Normally, the extension of credit by a grantor to a trust does not make eco-
nomic sense. This is because the grantor must pay income tax on the interest income
earned and the trust may be disallowed a corresponding interest deduction or lack
sufficient trust income to absorb its use. See generally I.R.C. § 163 (1994).
When a trust qualifies for grantor status, however, an extension of credit by the
grantor to the trust may prove attractive. For income tax purposes the loan is entirely
ignored: no deduction or income inclusion is required. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 95-35-026
(Sept. 1, 1995). Therefore, as long as the trust is able to command a return (for
example, 10%) on the loan proceeds that is greater than its interest obligation under
the loan (for example, 6%), wealth can inure transfer-tax free to the beneficiaries of
the trust. See generallyJay Soled, Simon Levin & Lionel Etra, Madet Interest Rate Loans:
A Simple and Effective Potential Estate Planning Tednique, 77 TAxES 37 (1999) (discussing
the transfer tax-saving opportunities that intra-family loans offer).
148 E.g., Robert T. Danforth, A Proposal for Integrating the Income and Transfer Taxa-
tion of Trusts. 18 VA. TAx Rx,. 545, 573-601 (1999);John B. Hufflaker et al., Is Income
Tax Payment by Grantor-owner of a Subpart E Trust a Taxable Gift?, 82J. TAx'N 202 (1995);
Jerry Kasner, Defective IRS Reasoning on Gift Tax Consequences of a Defective Trust, 66 TAx
Noms 1171 (1995).
149 If state and local tax burdens on a grantor are onerous and the trust's situs can
easily be moved to another state, the benefits of using a grantor trust may not be as
great as intended. See Carlyn S. McCaffrey, Collateral Consequences of Grantor Trust
Status; The Sword of the Service Becomes the Estate Planner's Plowshare 7-8 (Nov.
10, 1998) (unpublished manuscript presented at the New York Upstate Meeting of
the American College of Trust and Estate Counsel, on file with the Notre Dame Law
Review). For example, no NewYork State personal income tax may be imposed on a
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The Service has not welcomed taxpayers' blissful change of atti-
tudes towards grantor trust status. It has attacked the use of grantor
trust status as a tax minimization tool. One mode of attack has been
to argue that the grantor's payment of income tax constitutes an addi-
tional trust contribution, making it subject to gift tax. 150 The theory
underlying this line of attack by the Service is that the grantor has a
right under local law to reimbursement from the trustee for the gran-
tor's income tax payment.' 51 Should the grantor not exercise this
right of reimbursement, the grantor arguably has made a de facto
trust contribution that constitutes a taxable gift. The problem with
this line of attack, however, is that local law does not support the Ser-
vice's position; to the contrary, virtually all local laws seem to indicate
that the grantor has no right to reimbursement. 15 2 (Despite numer-
ous criticisms from tax commentators, 15 3 the Service has explicitly re-
fused to abandon this position.
54 )
A second line of attack has been to argue that the establishment
of a grantor trust constitutes a taxable gift at the date of trust incep-
tion. The Service has informally suggested that when a taxpayer delib-
erately establishes a grantor trust, the taxpayer has bound herself to
undertake the tax obligations of another. 5 5 The Service posits that
this voluntary undertaking constitutes a gift. 156 The Code and case
trust if the trust has no nexus to the state, even though the grantor is a New York
domiciliary. See N.Y. CoMp. CoDES R. & REGS. tit. 20, § 105.23 (1998).
150 See infra note 154.
151 There are two Pennsylvania cases that loosely appear to support the proposi-
tion that a grantor has a right to reimbursement for taxes he paid with respect to a
grantor trust. Doughty Trust, 6 Fiduc. Rep. 2d 260, 262 (Pa. Orphans' Ct. Montgom-
ery County 1985); French Estate, 61 Pa. D. & C.2d 654, 658 (Pa. Orphans' Ct. Phila.
County 1963). The outcome of each case, however, can be explained on equity
grounds rather than any direct right of reimbursement.
152 One commentator conducted an informal survey of the laws of the fifty states
and did not find a single state that provided the grantor with a right to reimburse-
ment. See Coleman, supra note 13, 'j 806.
153 See Danforth, supra note 148, at 573-601; Huffaker et al., supra note 148; Xas-
ner, supra note 148.
154 At one time, the Service would not issue a favorable ruling with respect to a
grantor-retained annuity trust unless the governing instrument contained a provision
directing the trustee to reimburse the grantor for income taxes paid by her on trust
income not distributed to her. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 94-44-033 (Aug. 5, 1994) ("If there
were no reimbursement provision, an additional gift to a remainderperson would oc-
cur when the grantor paid tax [on) any income that would otherwise be payable from
the corpus of the trust."). The Service, however, subsequently withdrew this ruling
and replaced it with another ruling that did not contain the quoted text. SeePrlv. Ltr.
Rul. 95-43-049 (Aug. 3, 1995).
155 See McCaffrey, supra note 149, at 15-17.
156 Id.
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law, however, do not support the Service's position. When a grantor
bears the trust's tax liabilities, those are indeed her own liabilities; she
is not undertaking the tax obligations of another. 157 In addition, de-
termining the value of the taxpayer's gift on the date of trust establish-
ment would make this line of attack extremely difficult to pursue.15-
The bottom line is that the plain language of the grantor trust
rules, combined with the Service's own position, seems to suggest that
taxpayers have the upper hand, if these techniques are everjudicially
challenged.
2. Grantor Trust Use to Minimize Income Tax
The benefits associated with grantor trust status do not end at
transfer tax minimization. They extend to the income tax arena as
well. Taxpayers use grantor trust status as a way to lessen their benefi-
ciaries' income tax burdens, 5 9 to facilitate trust useIGo and to avoid
157 See I.R.C. § 671 (1994); Rosenthal v. Comm'r, 205 F.2d 505, 508-10 (2d Cir.
1953); Comm'r v. Copley's Estate, 194 F.2d 364 (7th Cir. 1952); Harris v. Comm'r,
178 F.2d 861, 865 (2d Cir. 1949), rev'd on otllergrounds, 340 U.S. 106 (1950).
158 See McCaffrey, supra note 149, at 16-17.
159 One well-known sacrifice commonly associated with gifts in trust is that the tax
basis of the transferred property in the hands of the trust beneficiary ill usually be
that of the grantor. See I.R.C. § 1015(a) (1994). When a grantor pays gift tax, the tax
basis of the contributed property may be adjusted upwards. Id. § 1015(d) (6).
To ilustrate, consider the tax plight of a trust beneficiary when a grantor estab-
lishes a twenty-year term trust and transfers into such trust real estate with a $10 basis.
Suppose when the trustee distributes the trust property in year twenty, the fair market
value of the trust property has appreciated to $1000. The trust beneficiary uill receive
such property with a tax basis still equal to $10. Assuming the federal and state com-
bined tax rate is 30% and the trust beneficiary immediately sells the distributed prop-
erty, the trust beneficiary would have to recognize a $990 gain ($1000 - $10) and pay
$297 (.3 x $990) of tax.
To help avoid the trust beneficiary's potential income tax exposure, tax advisors
now advocate that their clients establish grantor trusts. &, e.g., Roth, supra note 145,
406. This maneuver may eliminate or minimize the income tax burden to the trust
beneficiaries who receive trust property. To accomplish this, the grantor purchases,
towards the end of the trust term, any highly appreciated trust assets using cash or
nonappreciated property. While this sale is ignored for income tax purposes, ee Rev
Rul. 85-13, 1985-1 C.B. 184, the trust beneficiary will receive nonappreciated property
or cash that can be sold for little, if any, gain. When the grantor ultimately dies, the
step-up in basis allowed to the grantor's estate will erase the taxable gain on the once-
held appreciated trust property. See I.R.C. § 1014(a) (Supp. IV 1998).
160 Grantor trust status often alleviates the income tax consequences associated
with the disposition of trust property. The two most common occasions when this
benefit is evident are when the grantor has, pursuant to Code § 2702, established a
grantor retained annuity trust (GRAT) or a qualified personal residence trust
(QPRT).
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A GRAT is an arrangement where the grantor establishes a trust and retains the
right to receive an annual annuity from the trust over the trust term. Grayson M.P.
McCouch, Rethinking Section 2702, 2 FL.h TAx L. REv. 99, 118-19 (1994). A QPRT is
an arrangement where the grantor establishes a trust funded with the grantor's per-
sonal residence or vacation home and retains the right to the use of the trust property
for a fixed number of years. John A. Miller & Jeffrey A. Maine, Fundamentals of Estate
Tax Planning, 32 IDAHo L. REv. 197, 249-50 (1996). In the case of a QPRT, the gran-
tor often retains a reversionary right in the trust in case of death prior to termination
of the trust term. Id.
By their terms, both GRATs and QPRTs qualify for grantor trust status. In the
case of a GRAT, the grantor's right to receive an annual annuity will make the grantor
owner of the income portion of the trust under Code § 677(a) (1). See I.R.C.
§ 677(a) (1) (1994). In addition, the grantor will be treated as the owner of the entire
trust for income tax purposes if the annuity payments can be made out of principal to
the extent income is insufficient. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 94-44-033 (Aug. 5, 1994), amended by
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 95-43-049 (Aug. 3, 1995).
In the case of a QPRT, the grantor's right to annual use of the trust property will
make the grantor owner of the income portion of the trust under Code § 677(a) (1).
See I.R.C. § 677(a) (1) (1994). The grantor will also generally be treated as owner of
the corpus under Code § 673 because of the grantor's reversionary right to trust prin-
cipal. See id. § 673.
The status of these trusts offers taxpayers tax-saving opportunities not found in
non-grantor trusts. For example, suppose a grantor establishes a ten-year GRAT, con-
tributing stock in a highly appreciated, closely-held business in which he has a zero
tax basis and the stock is worth $1 million. Suppose further that the terms of the
GRAT provide a $200,000 annual annuity to the grantor. If the stock did not generate
any income or grow in value in the first year, the trustee of the GRAT would have to
distribute $200,000 of stock with a zero basis to the grantor. Normally, the satisfaction
of a debt (that is, the annuity obligation) with appreciated property (that is, the
stock) would trigger a taxable gain (here $200,000). See Kenan v. Comm'r, 114 F.2d
217, 220 (2d Cir. 1940). However, due to the grantor trust status of a GRAT, this gain
is not recognized. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-52-017 (Sept. 30, 1993) (ruling that use of appre-
ciated property to satisfy an annuity obligation does not trigger gain); Priv. Ltr. Rul.
93-52-007 (Sept. 28, 1993) (same); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 93-51-005 (Sept. 16, 1993) (same);
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 92-39-015 (June 25, 1992).
In addition to a GRAT, suppose a grantor also establishes a ten year QPRT
funded with the grantor's personal residence, worth $1 million, in which he has a
$500,000 tax basis. Due to the grantor trust status of the trust, the grantor can con-
tinue to command deductions associated with home ownership (for example, mort-
gage interest and real estate taxes). Priv. Ltr. Rul. 1999-16-030 (Jan. 22, 1999) (ruling
that mortgage interest, tax, and other deductions are allocable to income). Further-
more, the trustee of the QPRT may also sell this residence and exclude part or all of
the gain from the grantor's income under Code § 121. See Rev. Rul. 85-45, 1985-1
C.B. 183 (holding that the prior exclusion of $125,000 of gain allowed to persons age
fifty-five or older would be applied to sales of principal residences held in grantor
trusts as if the sale were made to the grantor); see also Priv. Ltr. Rul. 1999-12-026 (Dec.
23, 1998) (ruling that the new exclusion under Code § 121 applies to grantor trusts).
This Code section permits homeowners to exclude $250,000 of gain on the sale of a
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the transfer for value rule that pertains to the sale of life insurance
policies. 16
1
principal residence ($500,000 for spouses filing a joint return). I.R.C. § 121(b)
(Supp. IV 1998).
161 The Code provides that the receipt of life insurance proceeds is excluded from
income. I.R.C. § 101(a) (1) (1994). This rule is subject, however, to an exception
known as the transfer for value rule. The transfer for value rule provides that, if a life
insurance policy is transferred for valuable consideration, the proceeds of such policy
are includible in income. Id § 101(a) (2) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). This exception is
itself subject to an exception: the transfer for value rule does not apply if (a) the
transferee's basis in such insurance policy is determined in whole or in part by refer-
ence to the transferor's basis, id. § 101 (a) (2) (A), or (b) such transfer is to the in-
sured, id. § 101 (a) (2) (B).
Grantor trust status can play a pivotal role in ensuring that life insurance pro-
ceeds remain excluded from a taxpayer's income. Consider the situation in which a
taxpayer owns a life insurance policy and wishes to transfer this policy to an irrevoca-
ble trust and yet avoid application of the three-year estate tax inclusion rule that ap-
plies to transfers of life insurance policies made within three years of death. &e id.
§ 2035(a) (1994). The taxpayer could contribute cash to the trust and have the trust
purchase the policy from him. The three-year estate tax inclusion rule does not apply
in the context of a bona fide purchase. Id. § 2035(d). In addition, the transfer for
value rule would not apply, because under the grantor trust rules (a) the trustee who
purchases the policy will have the taxpayer's tax basis in the purchased policy (thus
meeting the first transfer for value exception under Code § 101(a) (2) (A)) and, even
if the first exception did not apply, (b) the trust and insured are treated as if they are
one and the same (thus meeting the second transfer for value exception under Code
§ 101(a)(2)(B)). See id. § 101(a)(2)(A)-(B).
By enabling the grantor to avoid the transfer for valuc rules, grantor trust status
also offers taxpayers tremendous flexibility in arranging their financial affairs. Con-
sider the situation of a taxpayer who establishes an irrevocable mrust that holds a re-
cently-purchased $1 million life insurance policy on the life of the taxpayer with a
current cash surrender value of $20,000. Suppose the trust is for the benefit of the
taxpayer's daughter and terminates when the taxpayer's daughter attains age thirty.
Suppose further that the taxpayer subsequently has reservations concerning his
daughter's financial acumen and thinks that age forty would be a more appropriate
age restriction limitation in the trust The taxpayer may establish a new irrevocable
trust funded with $20,000 that has an age forty restriction limitation. Assuming the
trustees of the old trust and new trust agree, the trustee of the old trust may sell the
life insurance policy it holds to the trustee of the new trust for the policy's fair market
value. Again, because of the grantor trust status of the two irrevocable trusts, this
transfer should not trigger the transfer for value rule. S&e Swanson v. Comm'r, 518
F.2d 59, 63-64 (8th Cir. 1975) (equating a purchase by the grantor trust to a purchase
by the grantor-insured), affg33 T.C.M. (P-H) 278 (1974); see alsoJayA. Soled, Strate-
gies for Handling a Life Insurance Trust That No Longer Meets the Grantor's Needs, 21 TAx
MGtrr. EST. Gur-s & TR.J. 207 (1996) (discussing the advantages of utilizing grantor
trusts as a tool to eliminate life insurance trusts that no longer serve a useful
purpose).
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Grantor trust status offers taxpayers tremendous flexibility in tax
reduction opportunities. Barring one exception, 16 2 grantors are es-
sentially able (assuming the trustee consents) to switch title to prop-
erty in and out of trust without any negative tax consequences. This
flexibility all comes, of course, at the expense of the government.
Ill. SECURING GRANTOR TRUST STATUS
Given the broad scope of the grantor trust rules, securing grantor
trust status is relatively easy. But there are two additional conditions
that must be met in order for grantors to achieve the tax minimization
results described in the prior Section. First, violation of the grantor
trust rules must not leave the grantor vulnerable to having the trust-
held property includible in the grantor's gross estate. Second, the en-
tire trust-not just a portion thereof-must qualify for grantor trust
status.
A. Similarities and Distinctions Between the Grantor Trust Rules and the
Estate Tax Inclusion Rules
The estate tax inclusion rules operate on the same basic premise
as the grantor trust rules. If a grantor retains certain indicia of domin-
ion and control over trust-held property-albeit not outright owner-
ship-such property is includible in the grantor's gross estate. Three
so-called "string sections" comprise the mainstay of these rules: trust-
held property is includible in the grantor's gross estate, if the grantor
has retained (a) the right to beneficial enjoyment or control over trust
property, 63 (b) a reversionary interest in trust property (under cer-
tain and limited cirumstances),'6 or (c) the right to alter, amend,
revoke, or terminate a trust.165
In the vast majority of cases, the grantor trust rules and the estate
tax inclusion rules function in unison. How one set of rules defines
indicia of dominion and control is essentially how the other set of
rules defines indicia of dominion and control and vice versa. Property
162 The Treasury Department recently adopted regulations that require that the
terms of personal residence trusts prohibit the sale or transfer of the trust-held resi-
dence directly or indirectly to the grantor. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2702-5(c)(9) (as
amended in 1997). Treasury adopted this regulation because it believed that the
transfer of the residence back to the grantor thwarted congressional intent. T.D.
8743, 1998-1 C.B. 543.
163 I.R.G. § 2036(a) (1994).
164 Id. § 2037(a).
165 Id. § 2038(a).
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held in a grantor trust, therefore, is also likely to be included in the
grantor's gross estate. 166
Two critical factors, however, distinguish the grantor trust rules
from the estate tax inclusion rules. First, despite all their overlap, the
grantor trust rules and the estate tax inclusion rules define indicia of
dominion and control somewhat differently. The grantor trust rules
take a sweeping approach, classifying any trust in which the grantor
has any vestige of retained dominion and control (including, for ex-
ample, the administrative right to reacquire trust property and substi-
tute property of equivalent value) as a grantor trust.167 The estate tax
inclusion rules do not have quite the same breadth. They permit the
grantor to retain certain indicia of dominion and control (including,
for example, the administrative right to reacquire trust property and
substitute property of equivalent value) without causing inclusion of
the trust-held property in the grantor's gross estate.' s
Second, the grantor trust rules require a thorough analysis of the
powers and rights, if any, held or vested in others, including the gran-
tor's spouse and other so-called nonadverse parties.'6 9 In contrast,
the estate tax inclusion rules only scrutinize whether the grantor has a
power in or right over trust property.170 If no such right or power is
found, the trust-held property is not includible in the grantor's gross
estate. 171 Therefore, if the grantor trust rules are violated as a result
of a third-party power or right, this violation will virtually never cause
the trust-held property to be included in the grantor's gross estate.
172
166 A simple example illustrates this point. Suppose a grantor establishes a revoca-
ble trust to which she transfers title to a building. Due to the grantor trust status of
this trust, see id. § 676(a), during the trust term any rental income, deductions, or
credits against tax associated with the operation of this building must be reported on
the grantor's individual income tax return. Id. § 671. Upon grantor's death, due to
the revocable nature of the trust, the building's fair market value will likeise be in-
cludible in the grantor's gross estate and must be reported on the grantors estate tax
return. Id. § 2038(a).
167 Id. § 675(4)(C).
168 SeeEstate ofJordahl v. Comm'r, 65 T.C. 92,96 (1975) (holding that a grantors
power to substitute property did not constitute a power "to 'alter, amend, or revoke'
the trust"), acq., 1977-1 G.B. 1.
169 See generally I.R.C. § 672 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
170 Subtitle B of the Code is entitled "Estate and Gift Taxes." References therein
are to the decedent, not to any other taxpayer.
171 See; ag., I.R.C. § 2033 (1994) ("The value of the gross estate shall include the
value of all property to the extent of the interest therein of the decendent at the time
of his death.").
172 That is, of course, unless the grantor of a trust had an oral or written arrange-
ment that another party will act as the grantor's agent. Se Estate of Skinner v. United
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The incomplete harmony between these two sets of rules permits
the seemingly impossible to be achieved: abracadabra, a grantor can
establish a trust where he is treated as the owner of the trust-held
property for income tax purposes, but not for transfer tax purposes.
Given the similarities between these two systems of taxation, this
achievement is not necessarily easy. But through the careful selection
of trust terms and/or trustees, the grantor may accomplish this magi-
cal feat and exploit the tax minimization techniques previously
enumerated.
I7 3
B. Methods to Secure Grantor Trust Status for the Entire Trust
To achieve tax minimization, one must not only avoid estate tax
inclusion, but also ensure that the entire trust qualifies as a grantor
trust. If only a portion of the trust qualifies for grantor trust status,
1 74
the intended unity between the grantor and trust will not be met, and
the grantor may forfeit some or all of the tax benefits associated with
the use of grantor trust status. There are various methods that grant-
ors can use to achieve unity between themselves and the trusts they
establish. The methods are presented in order of their likely effective-
ness and judicial soundness.
1. Code § 675(4): The Right to Reacquire Trust Property and
Substitute Other Property of Equivalent Value
The right to reacquire trust property and substitute other prop-
erty of equivalent value triggers grantor trust status, if (i) the right is
held by any person acting in a nonfiduciary capacity, and (ii) exercise
of this right does not need the consent or approval of a person acting
in a fiduciary capacity. 175 Properly placed, this seemingly benign right
can transform the status of any trust into a grantor trust.
While a reacquisition right triggers grantor trust status, its use
does not trigger the estate tax inclusion rules. This is because this
States, 316 F.2d 517, 520 (3d Cir. 1963); Estate of Green v. Comm'r, 64 T.C. 1049,
1063 (1975), acq., 1976-2 C.B. 2.
173 See infra Part III.B.
174 See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
175 I.R.C. § 675(4) (1994). To illustrate, suppose a grantor establishes a trust that
designates his sister as trustee. Suppose further that the terms of the trust provide the
grantor with the right to reacquire any or all the trust property as long as he substi-
tutes other property of equivalent value and, in exercising this right, he acts in a non-
fiduciary capacity. Under this set of circumstances, Code § 675 deems the grantor the
owner of the entire trust. See id.
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power can be held by anyone.176 In addition, even if the grantor di-
rectly holds this right, the estate tax inclusion rules are not triggered,
because the mere right to reacquire trust property and substitute
property of equivalent value does not secure any economic advantage
or procure any vestige of control in the grantor.
1 "
Besides not triggering the estate tax inclusion rules, the structure
of Code § 675 serves another useful role. It secures blanket grantor
trust status. In its prefacing language, Code § 675 provides that the
"grantor shall be treated as the owner of any portion of a trust in
respect of which" the grantor or nonadverse party holds an enumer-
ated administrative power.'78 When the terms of the trust vest the
grantor or nonadverse party with a reacquisition power over all the
trust-held property, grantor trust status correspondingly attaches to
the entire trust.
1 7 9
There is one caveat regarding the use of a reacquisition and sub-
stitution right. The Code requires that the person who possesses this
right hold it in a nonfiduciary capacity. 80 Whether a person holds
this right in a nonfiduciary capacity "depends on all the terms of the
trust and the circumstances surrounding its creation and administra-
tion."181 There is, however, no administrative or judicial guidance to
help determine in what capacity a person acts.182
176 The Code uses the term "reacquire," which implies that the person who made
the trust contribution must be the same party who holds this right. e id. The issue,
however, of who possesses the right of reacquisition is not addressed in the regula-
tions and the Service appears to ignore it. &, eg., Priv. Ltr. Rul. 90-37-011 (June 14,
1990) ("Provided that the circumstances surrounding the administration of the power
held by [A, the trustee,] to substitute property of equal vulue for the trust corpus do
not indicate that the power is held in a fiduciary capacity,... [B, the grantor,] shall
be treated as the owner of all of the [t] rust under section 675 ... ."); see also Priv. Ltr.
Rul. 96-42-039 (July 18, 1996) (ruling that the power of substituting rights with a
third party could qualify the trust for grantor trust status); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 97-13-017
(Dec. 27, 1996) (same).
177 See Estate ofJordahl v. Comm'r, 65 T.C. 92, 97 (1975); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 95-48-013
(Aug. 29, 1995) ("A and B's powers with respect to his or her trust to reacquire and
substitute trust corpus with property of equal vaue... do not constitute a power to
alter, amend, or revoke the trusts within the meaning of section 2038(a), and there-
fore do not require that each trust's property be included in the gross estate of its
respective grantor under section 2038(a) ...
178 I.RC. § 675 (1994).
179 Id. § 675(4)(c).
180 Id. § 675(4).
181 Treas. Reg. § 1.675-1(b)(4) (1960). Due to the factual nature of this inquiry,
the Service will not issue private letter rulings regarding this determination. &e, e.g.,
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 1999-22-007 (Feb. 10, 1999); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 98-23-005 (Feb. 12, 1998).
182 Commentators suggest that one possible and recommended way of meeting
this requirement is to stipulate in the trust instrument that the person vested with a
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2. Code § 674: Power to Add Beneficiaries
The general rule regarding beneficial control over trust property
is set forth under Code § 674(a): a grantor will be treated as the
owner of any portion of-a trust in respect of which the grantor has
"beneficial enjoyment.' u 3 This general rule, however, is subject to
several important exceptions. 84 None of these exceptions apply (and
grantor trust classification will be bestowed) in instances where any
person (other than an adverse party) has a power to add beneficiaries
to receive trust income or corpus.'8 5 This is true unless such power "is
to provide for after-born or after-adopted children.
'186
Given the general rule of Code § 674(a), its exceptions, and ex-
ceptions to those exceptions, there is one way a grantor may achieve
grantor trust status that will meet all the grantor's tax objectives. The
grantor can give a person (for example, the trustee) the right to add
beneficiaries other than after-born or after-adopted children to the
trust.187
While another person's right to add trust beneficiaries triggers
grantor trust status, its presence does not trigger the estate tax inclu-
sion rules. This right confers no economic benefit to the grantor and,
absent a written or oral agreement, 18 8 does not give the grantor the
ability to exercise beneficial control over the trust-held assets. In sum,
while the right to add beneficiaries is sufficient for income tax pur-
reacquisition and substitution power holds it in a nonfiduciary capacity. Mark L.
Ascher, Grantor Trusts and Their Interplay with Transfer Taxes F-11 (Mar. 18-19,
1996) (unpublished manuscript presented at the Puerto Rico Meeting of the Ameri-
can College of Trust and Estate Counsel, on file with the Notre Dame Law Review).
Under no circumstances, however, should this power be vested in a person who also
acts as a fiduciary. The treasury regulations establish a rebuttable presumption that a
trustee always acts in a fiduciary capacity. Treas. Reg. § 1.675-1 (b) (4) (1960).
183 I.R.C. § 674(a) (1994).
184 See id. § 674(b)-(d) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
185 Id. § 674(b) (5) (flush language), (6) (flush language), (7) (flush language),
(c) (flush language), (d) (1994).
186 Id. § 674(d).
187 To illustrate, suppose the grantor establishes a trust that designates his brother
as trustee. Suppose further that the terms of the trust provide discretionary income
and corpus distributions to the grantor's married son and also vests the trustee with
the right to add the son's spouse as a trust beneficiary. Under this set of circum.
stances, Code § 674(a) deems the grantor the owner of the entire trust.
Given the significance of this right in terms of dictating ultimate beneficial own-
ership of trust property, the grantor would obviously want to limit the scope of this
person's right to expand the class of beneficiaries to perceived friendly parties, such
as the spouses of the grantor's children. See id. § 674(a).
188 See supra note 172.
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poses to treat the grantor as having dominion and control over the
entire trust, the converse is not true for transfer tax purposes.
3. Code § 674(c): Power to Control Discretionary Distributions
Grantor trust status generally applies to any spray trust (that is,
where the trustees have the discretionary right to distribute trust in-
come and principal between and among trust beneficiaries as they de-
termine) .189 There is, however, an exception to this general rule (and
non-grantor trust status will apply) when three conjunctive conditions
are met. These conditions are as follows: (1) neither the grantor nor
the grantor's spouse is trustee, (2) no more than half of the trustees
are related or subordinate parties who are subservient to the wishes of
the grantor, and (3) the exercise of the spray right does not require
the approval or consent of any other person. 190
Designating the grantor's spouse as a trustee over a spray trust
qualifies the trust for grantor trust status, because the exception to the
general rule does not apply.' 9 ' From the grantor's perspective, this
designation should prove painless: the grantor's spouse will likely ad-
here to the grantor's wishes, and this designation should not trigger
the estate tax inclusion rules.'9 2 This option, however, suffers from
two deficiencies: the spouse may die or the grantor's marriage may
falter. Should either event occur, grantor trust status would end.
Another way to achieve grantor trust status with a spray trust and
avoid estate tax inclusion is to designate a person who is given veto
authority over the trustees' discretionary distributions.193 This person
can be anyone except an adverse party (for example, a loyal sibling of
the grantor). Use of this option does not suffer the same deficiencies
as the first option, yet it permits the grantor to fulfill the same tax
minimization agenda.194
189 See I.1.C. § 674(a) (1994); Carson v. Comm'r, 92 T.C. 1134, 1137-38, 1140
(1989) (holding that a "spraying" power was retained over all of a trust's income by
virtue of a discriminatory power held directly by one grantor and indirectly by a co-
grantor spouse, resulting in all of the trust income being taxable to the grantors).
190 I.R.C. § 674(c) (1994).
191 See id
192 Estate tax inclusion rules focus exclusively on powers held by a decedent, not
others. See generally id. §§ 2036-2038.
193 See id. § 674(c).
194 Violation of the second condition could cause inclusion of the trust-held prop-
erty in the grantor's gross estate. If the trustees are considered subservient to the
grantor's wishes, they might be deemed to be the grantor's alter ego, making the
assets of the trust vulnerable to estate tax inclusion. But see Priv. Ltr. Rul. 95.43-050
(Aug. 3, 1995) (holding that the trustee's subservient relationship uarranted grantor
2( )1]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
4. Code § 675 (2): Right to Borrow Without Adequate Security
Full grantor trust status attaches to any trust when the grantor or
a nonadverse party, or both, holds power to allow the grantor to bor-
row trust income and corpus, directly or indirectly, without adequate
security.195 A strategically incorporated trust provision that specifi-
cally authorizes the trustee to lend trust income and corpus to the
grantor without adequate security should, therefore, result in full
grantor trust status. Furthermore, although not free from doubt,190
the grant of such a power should not trigger application of the estate
tax inclusion rules, which have no provision that directly corresponds
to Code § 675(2).
5. Code § 676 and Code § 677: Designation of Spouse as a Trust
Beneficiary
For purposes of the grantor trust rules, the Code essentially con-
siders the grantor and the grantor's spouse as being the same per-
son.197 The grantor is deemed to hold any power held by the
grantor's spouse.198 In contrast, the transfer tax rules do not make
this same equation of identities. 99 Were the terms of a trust to make
the grantor's spouse a trust beneficiary, 200 the trust would qualify as a
grantor trust, yet its terms would not trigger the estate tax inclusion
rules.201 However, because the successful utilization of this rule de-
pends on the longevity of the spouse and the success of the marriage
between the grantor and his or her spouse, few tax advisors favor its
use to achieve grantor trust status.
trust classification, but further holding that trust-held property would not be included
in the grantor's estate under Code § 2036).
195 LR.C. § 675(2) (1994). This Code section does not apply, however, when it is
made part of a general lending power, the regulations require more specificity.
Treas. Reg. § 1.675-1(b)(2) (1960).
196 At least one commentator suggests that providing the grantor with a power to
borrow without adequate security could cause inclusion of trust property in the gruin-
tor's gross estate under Code §§ 2036 or 2038. See McCaffrey, supra note 149, at 53.
197 See I.R.C. § 672(e) (1994).
198 Id.
199 See supra notes 169-73 and accompanying text.
200 I.R.C. §§ 676-677 (1994).
201 E.g., Estate of Mitchell v. Comm'r, 55 T.C. 576, 580-81 (1970) (holding that
the decedent did not retain or reserve the possession or enjoyment of, or right to the
income from, the property transferred into trust to be used for the spouse's benefit),
acq., 1971-1 C.B. 2.
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IV. REFORMNMG THE GRANTOR TRUST RULES
Grantor trust rules, once an effective method of checking taxpay-
ers' abuses, are now themselves a method of abuse. To curb this
abuse and to simplify the Code, there are at least two well-known and
well-respected commentators who advocate outright repeal of the
grantor trust rules.202 They believe that the grantor trust rules can be
cast aside, if Congress would require all trust income during the gran-
tor's lifetime (whether accumulated or distributed) to be taxed at the
grantor's marginal tax rate.203 Under at least one of these proposals,
this would be accomplished in two steps: (1) each trust would com-
pute its own taxable income essentially as an individual and pay tax
based on that income, and (2) then the taxpayer would include the
trust income on the taxpayer's return and take a credit for the tax
paid by the trust.
20 4
While the arguments these commentators advance in favor of re-
pealing the grantor trust rules and replacing them with a different
taxing regime are appealing, they suffer from several flaws. First, the
income tax treatment for outright gifts and those made in trust should
be consistent: there is no theoretical justification for income on gifted
property to be taxed at the recipient's rate in the case of the former
and at the grantor's rate in the case of the latter. This creates an
incentive for taxpayers to make outright gifts when trust contributions
might be more appropriate. Second, repeal of the grantor trust rules
and their replacement by a system that taxes grantors on trust income
would, in the case of irrevocable trusts-where trust contributions
most often constitute completed gifts-perpetuate inconsistencies be-
tween the income and the transfer tax systems. This is particularly
troublesome since previous experience indicates that taxpayers are
prone to exploit these inconsistencies. Finally, supplanting the gran-
tor trust rules with a new set of rules that recognizes the existence of
all trusts would correspondingly require the preparation and submis-
sion of tax returns on behalf of all trusts. (This would include trustees
having to file a tax return on behalf of the most popular choice of
trust instrument, namely those trusts that are revocable in nature,
when no such burden currently exists.)205- The addition of a new ad-
202 See Joseph M. Dodge, Simpli ,ing Models for the Income Ta.ation of Tnesis and
Estates, 14 Am.J. TAx POL'Y 127 (1997); Sherwin Kamin, A Proposal for the Income Taxa-
tion of Trusts and Estate, Their Grantors, and Their Benefidaria, 13 Am.J. Tux PoL'" 215
(1996).
203 See Dodge, supra note 202, at 150-56; Kamin, supra note 202, at 227-30.
204 See Kamin, supra note 202, at 222.
205 See supra note 98.
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ministrative burden makes this new taxing regime immediately
suspect.
Although repeal of the grantor trust rules is not the answer, re-
form is clearly in order.20 6 Congress should overhaul these rules to
make them compatible with the rest of the Code and harmonize them
with the transfer tax rules. This reform would stem the hemorrhage
of tax dollars lost due to taxpayers who use grantor trust stratagems,
simplify the Code, and renew public respect for these rules.
Reform should be founded upon a basic premise: when a trust
contribution resembles a completed gift (that is, when a grantor parts
with all dominion and control over trust property), the trust (or the
trust beneficiaries) should be the responsible taxpayer; alternatively,
when a trust contribution resembles an incomplete gift (that is, when
a grantor does not part with all dominion and control over trust prop-
erty), the contributor of such property, namely the grantor, should be
the responsible taxpayer. This premise has an intuitive appeal, and it
is based upon an existing and well-established body of law with respect
to inter vivos gift-giving.
20 7
Accomplishing this reform can be achieved by changing the defi-
nition of grantor trust status to narrow its scope, by eliminating trust
distribution deductions under certain circumstances, 20 8 and by
amending the definition of a taxable gift, the concept of a gross es-
tate, and several other Code provisions.20 9 Other than the changes
proposed, the rules set forth in SubchapterJ would remain intact.
206 Reforming the grantor trust rules could be undertaken in a series of different
ways. One way would be to repeal or amend those grantor rules that specifically foster
taxpayer gamesmanship. In some instances, reform of this nature could be easily in-
stituted. With little collateral repercussions to the Code, Congress could, for exam-
ple, repeal Code § 675(4) (C), the so-called "reacquisition and substitution power."
See I.R C. § 675(4) (c) (1994). But in the vast majority of instances, Congress would
find tinkering with the existing grantor trust rules frustrating. This is because the
encompassing nature of the grantor trust rules would remain out of sync with the
Code's current progressive rate structure and it is highly unlikely that mere tinkering
with these rules would result in a coordinated set of rules between the income and
transfer tax systems. See Griswold, supra note 142, at 342 ("[While] [i~t might then
appear that further tinkering would be desirable .... the process could go on result-
ing in ever increasing statutory complexity.").
207 See supra text accompanying note 22.
208 See I.R.C. §§ 651, 661 (1994).
209 Many Code sections cross-reference Code § 671 or Subpart E. E.g., id.
§ 1361(c) (2) (A) (i) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). Congress would have to analyze each of
these Code sections to determine whether and how they would need to be changed.
(VOL. 76:2
REFORMING THE GRANTOR TRUST RULES
A. Proposed Definition of Grantor Trust Status
During the lifetime of the grantor, grantor trust status should
only apply in two situations: (1) when the terms of the trust require
payments of trust property to the grantor or grantor's spouse or (2)
when payments of trust property can be made currently to the grantor
or the grantor's spouse under a discretionary, revocation, or amend-
ment power exercisable by the grantor or the grantor's spouse,
whether acting alone or in conjunction with any other person.210 This
proposed definition of grantor trust status combines current Code
§§ 676 and 677(a) (1), both of which were enacted before the grantor
trust rules.21' Their enactment and retention under the proposal
makes sense even today, because when the grantor or the grantor's
spouse has direct access or use of trust property, the grantor should be
treated as having complete dominion and control over trust property
and taxed accordingly.212
This proposed definition of grantor trust status implicitly
presumes that a grantor would only solicit a friendly party to serve in a
fiduciary capacity, erasing the degree of allegiance issue that a trustee
or another party has to the grantor under Code § 672.213
210 In some significant ways, this proposal resembles a proposal made by the
American Law Institute over a decade and a half ago. See Am. Lw INST., FEDElm
INcoz~m TAx PROJECT SumcHA ,RJ: PROPOSALS ON THE TAxmrloN OF TRusr AND Es.
TATE INCOME AND INCOME IN RESPECT OF DE EDENrS 14 (1985) [hereinafter PROOS-
ALs]. Several subsequent tax acts necessitate that the American Law Institute proposal
be refined and updated. In addition, elements of this proposal can also be found in
the Treasury Department Report to the President. The proposal would maintain
Code § 679 in its present form. 2 U.S. TREAsuRY DEP'T, TAX REFOW.I FOR FANTSS,
SwPUcrry, AND ECONOMIc GRowTH 96-109 (1984).
211 See supra notes 39, 49.
212 As a general rule, tax should be borne by the party with the liquidity to bear its
burden. See Edward A. Zelinsky, For Realization: Income Taxation, Secloral Accretionism,
and the Virtue of Attainable Virtues, 19 CADozo L REv. 861, 889-93 (1997) (making a
case for retaining the concept of realization to determine taxable events by highlight-
ing the importance liquidity plays in shaping tax timing issues under the Code). The
further the government strays from this principle, the greater the perceived tax bur-
den and the difficulty of tax collection may become. Magill, supra note 74, at 129.
[I]n general, an individual should be taxed on the income he receives,
and not on what he does not and cannot receive. [My proposal arises out of
my] concern for settor-fathers who were being subjected to tax upon in-
come which they did not and could not receive, their total income taxes
sometimes exceeding their actual money incomes.
Id.
213 With regard to the utility-or lack thereof-of the definitions relating to ad-
verse and nonadverse parties, one commentator once declared that "[t]he 'indepen-
dence' from grantor influence which is presumed to reside in the bosom of the
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B. Special Restriction on Trust Distribution Deductions
To discourage the renewal of income-shifting opportunities that
might flow from a restrictive definition of grantor trust status, the law
should include a special restriction on otherwise allowable trust distri-
bution deductions under SubchapterJ. 214 This restriction would ap-
ply if the grantor or grantor's spouse were to have a "reversionary
interest" in a portion of a trust. Any portion of the trust in which the
grantor held a reversionary interest would be taxed to the trust, unless
such income was to inure to a charitable beneficiary.
Consider the situation of a grantor whose income is subject to the
highest marginal tax rate and who would like to shift income tempora-
rily to her son whose income is taxed at the lowest marginal tax rate.
Following the Clifford model, the grantor could establish a short-term
trust for a period of five years that paid income currently to her son
and then reverted to the grantor upon the trust's termination. Under
the proposal set forth, the terms of this trust would not cause it to be
classified as a grantor trust and, absent the proposed changes to Sub-
chapterJ, the grantor's son would pay tax on all the trust income dis-
tributed to him. This would present the grantor with a tempting
opportunity to shift income, at least on a temporary basis.
Reforming the grantor trust rules thus requires that steps be
taken to restrict distribution deductions to prevent a renewal of in-
come-shifting between grantors and the trusts they establish. Under
the proposal at hand, the trust in the prior example would not be
entitled to any distribution deductions with respect to income distrib-
grantor's banker, lawyer, or accountant may be more apparent than real in many
cases." MARvIN A. CHIRELSTEIN, FEDERAL INcOME TAXATION 217 (8th ed. 1997).
In addition, any rule that has proven to be a trap for the unwary or that fails to
achieve its intended purpose does not warrant retention. In the past, these defini-
tions have resulted in some taxpayers bearing tax when they did not expect the gran-
tor trust rules to apply. E.g., Paxton v. Comm'r, 520 F.2d 923, 927 (9th Cir. 1975)
(holding that a 3.84% interest of one trustee upon termination did not render him
adverse as to the entire trust but only as to his share); Holt v. United States, 669 F.
Supp. 751, 752 (W.D. Va. 1987) (holding that the trustee's beneficial interest was too
remote to be classified as adverse), aftd, 842 F.2d 1291 (4th Cir. 1988). Other taxpay-
ers have deliberately violated these definitions, resulting in intentional tax relief. See,
e.g., Madorin v. Comm'r, 84 T.C. 667, 668-69 (1985) (involving a taxpayer who cre-
ated, with the intention of establishing trusts qualifying for grantor trust status, four
trusts and gave an independent trustee power to add one or more charitable organi-
zations as beneficiaries of each trust).
214 See generally I.R.C. §§ 651(a), 661 (a) (1994) (permitting current distribution
deductions for simple and complex trusts).
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uted to the grantor's son; all income would be taxable to the trust,
subject to its marginal tax rate.
215
The grantor or grantor's spouse would be deemed to hold a re-
versionary interest in a portion of a trust under any one of the follow-
ing set of circumstances:
216
" the grantor or grantor's spouse holds a specified administra-
tive trust power (for example, the right to borrow trust funds
without adequate security or interest);
217
" the grantor or the grantor's spouse, alone or in conjunction
with any person, has a power to determine who would receive
present or future trust benefits;
* a person other than the grantor or the grantor's spouse has a
current discretionary power to make payments of a portion of
the trust property to the grantor or the grantor's spouse or to
provide for future payments to either one; or
" trust income is applied or distributed by another person, the
trustee, or the grantor acting as trustee or co-trustee for the
support or maintenance of a beneficiary (other than the gran-
tor's spouse) whom the grantor is legally obligated to support
and maintain.
This trust distribution deduction disallowance derives its salient
features from several current grantor trust rules. The fact that the
grantor or the grantor's spouse retains a reversionary interest (and
thus tacit dominion and control) in the trust property qualifies the
grantor or the trust, rather than the trust beneficiary, as the appropri-
ate taxpayer. Due to liquidity concerns and the need to coordinate
the income and transfer tax systems, the trust seems the more sensible
choice.
C. Coordinating the Income and Transfer Systems of Taxation
Adopting a proposal to limit grantor trust status would also facili-
tate coordination of the income and transfer tax systems where trust
contributions are concerned. As it stands, these rules are indepen-
215 Some commentators might argue that taxing trust income under the com-
pressed rate schedule of Code § 1(e) under these circumstances would be punitive in
nature. Dodge, supra note 202, at 153. But because trusts are often established by
economically well-to-do taxpayers whose own income is subject to the highest margi-
nal bracket rate, trust income would not necessarily bear a higher rate of tax than
under the current grantor trust rules.
216 See PROPOSALS, supra note 210, at 15-16.
217 These powers would be akin to those specified under current Code § 675. &e
I.R.C. § 675 (1994).
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dent of each other.218 By mere coincidence, they sometimes function
in unison; other times, they do not. And in cases of the latter, not
only does this lack of harmonization foment judicial frustration, 219 it
fosters artful tax dodging as well.220
Coordination would start from the following two interrelated sup-
positions: (1) when taxpayers make incomplete gifts, the value of the
property they transfer is not subject to gift tax, but taxpayers remain
responsible for income and estate taxes on it; and (2) when taxpayers
make completed gifts, their transfers are ordinarily subject to gift tax,
but not income or estate taxes related to such property.221
When grantor trust status applies, the grantor's trust contribution
would be deemed incomplete and would not constitute a taxable gift
(except to the extent payments under the trust instrument are made
to someone other than the grantor). This outcome is instinctual:
grantors who continue to be taxed on income generated by trust-held
property would likely equate such property as being theirs, not expect-
ing transfer tax repercussions until their deaths (when the value of
such trust-held property would be includible in their gross estates).
When grantor trust status does not apply, a grantor's contribu-
tion to a trust would be deemed complete and would constitute a taxa-
ble gift.222 The trust or the trust's beneficiaries would be the
responsible taxpayer, and the value of the property held in the trusts
would generally not be includible in the grantor's gross estate. 223
D. The Proposal in Perspective
Had the Clifford case come before the Supreme Court today,
there is little reason to think that Justice Douglas would have been
able to assemble a majority opinion in support of his position that the
grantor, rather than the trust established by the grantor, be taxed.
218 See supra notes 141-44 and accompanying text.
219 E.g., Comm'r v. Prouty, 115 F.2d 331, 337 (1st Cir. 1940) ("[Tlhe interrelation
of [various taxes] presents many puzzling problems which deserve the attention of
Congress.").
220 E.g., Willard H. Pedrick, The Artful Dodger Trust Faces Life and Looks at Death, 28
TAxEs 1151 (1950).
221 Griswold, supra note 142, at 342.
222 There would be one minor exception to this rule: a trust contribution would
remain incomplete when the grantor retained the right to determine beneficial trust
ownership. See Estate of Sanford v. Comm'r, 308 U.S. 39, 46 (1939) (holding that
when a grantor retains the power to add or subtract beneficiaries, he has not yet made
a completed gift).
223 If the value of the reversionary interest exceeded five percent of the value of
such property, the value of such property would be includible in the grantor's gross
estate. I.R.C. § 2037(a) (1994).
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The evolution of the progressive rate structure combined with other
changes in the Code have nullified many of the justifications intrinsic
to the Clifford holding.
The same probably could not be said with respect to the decisions
in Bowers (where the taxpayer established a revocable trust) and RIS
(where the taxpayer benefited from the income of a trust he estab-
lished). In instances where the taxpayer retains direct dominion and
control over trust property, the taxpayer should be taxed on the in-
come such property generates.
The proposal for reform of the grantor trust rules retains (with
some refinement) the two Code sections that are central to the under-
pinnings of the Bowers and Wells decisions. Moreover, aside from the
theoretical justification for retention of these two Code sections, there
is a practical issue at stake as well, namely that the majority of estab-
lished trusts are revocable in nature. Therefore, ignoring them under
the Code relieves significant numbers of trustee taxpayers from the
burden of having to file annual trust income tax returns and the gov-
ernment from having to process such returns.
2 2 4
There are those in Congress and others, however, who may still
have serious misgivings regarding certain elements of the proposal.
More specifically, they may find fault with the provision that attempts
to coordinate the income and transfer tax systems and the introduc-
tion of a special restriction on trust distribution deductions. On both
counts these detractors have valid concerns, yet for different reasons.
Attempts to coordinate the transfer and income tax systems have
been part of the academic landscape for several decades. -' However,
each system of taxation is founded upon a different premise (that is,
one on the accretion of wealth and the other on the transfer of
wealth). These differing premises complicate efforts to coordinate
the two tax systems. Yet, even if this section of the proposal must be
tabled, its absence would not detract from the effect the rest of this
proposal would have on curbing abusive trust arrangements.
The special restriction on trust distribution deductions relating to
reversionary interests may also draw objections from commentators.
This is because Subchapter J currently permits deductible distribu-
tions of trust income to taxpayer beneficiaries whose income may be
224 See supra note 98. Professor Leo L. Schmolka proposed that Congress repeal
the grantor trust rules. Leo L. Schmolka, FLPs and GRATs: iat tolDo?, 86 TAx NOTES
1473, 1489-90 (2000). He recognized, however, that Congress should provide an ex-
ception for a trust wholly and currently revocable by the grantor acting alone, equat-
ing such a trust to nothing more than a custodial account. Id. at 1490 n.77.
225 See supra note 142.
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subject to lower tax rates.226 These commentators would argue that
any restriction on trust distribution deductions would unnecessarily
complicate trust administrations and is redundant given the com-
pressed income tax bracket structure of trusts and other progressive
rate safeguards that are already in place.227 Although the proposal
would ideally include the special restriction on trust distribution de-
ductions, this element of the proposal could also be shelved until such
time when the Code's progressive rate structure again becomes more
graduated.
CONCLUSION
Reform of the grantor trust rules would lead to several positive
changes in the Code: the grantor trust rules would be thrust into mo-
dernity, tax gamesmanship in the trust arena would be quashed, and
the income and transfer systems of taxation would apply in a more
uniform fashion.
This is not to say that the institution of this reform would be en-
tirely painless or without casualty.228 But in light of the current state
of affairs, where grantor trust status is overly inclusive and subject to
frequent taxpayer abuse, such are tolerable changes. Reform always
comes at some price and here that price is meager in comparison to
allowing the status quo to remain unchecked.
- Congress must therefore recast and modernize the grantor trust
rules. Absent such reform, the black letter of the Code will continue
to sanction the use of grantor trusts as a tax avoidance device. This is
certainly not what Congress intended when the grantor trust rules
were first instituted over half of a century ago, and it seems evident
that this is not what Congress now intends.
226 See I.R.C. §§ 651(a), 661(a) (1994).
227 See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.
228 Take, for example, the rules posited under Code § 2702. These rules currently
permit- grantors to make trust contributions that constitute completed gifts, even
when grantors continue to retain a direct trust interest. See McCouch, supra note 160,
at 117-21. Under the proposal, these trusts would be classified as grantor trusts. As
such, for gift tax purposes, contributions made to these trusts would be treated as
incomplete. Code § 2702 would therefore either fall by the wayside or have to be
significantly modified were this proposal instituted.
In addition to Code § 2702 being repealed or significantly modified, several
other adjustments to the Code would have to be made as well. For example, Code
§ 1361(c) (2) (A) (i) states that all grantor trusts qualify to be shareholders of an S
corporation. Were the scope of grantor trust status to be defined more narrowly,
Congress might want trusts that no longer qualify as grantor trusts under the proposal
to still qualify as S corporation shareholders. I.R.C. § 1361(c) (2) (A) (i) (1994 &
Supp. IV 1998).
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Only for nostalgic reasons should Congress thus retain the gran-
tor trust rules in their present form, but nostalgia is a poor basis upon
which to formulate tax policy.
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